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Abstract
This thesis contains three essays on disclosure of holdings by institutional in-
vestors. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical model that examines the impact of confi-
dential treatment requests made by institutional investors to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to delay disclosure of their holdings. Chapter 2 presents
another theoretical model that analyses how an informed trader trades strategically
in the presence of copycats who track his disclosed trades. Chapter 3 is an empiri-
cal study that examines the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual
funds’ performance.
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Thesis Introduction
This thesis contributes to the theoretical and empirical market microstructure lit-
erature by studying the impact of mandatory disclosure of holdings by institutional
investors. Institutional investors like mutual funds and hedge funds face manda-
tory disclosure requirements by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In
particular, Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires investment
managers (who manage more than US$100 million in assets) to publicly disclose their
portfolio holdings within 45 days after the end of every quarter. Mandatory disclo-
sure allows fund investors to monitor the performance and holdings of the funds. This
helps them in their asset allocation and diversification decision, and also enables them
to see whether the fund manager is complying with its stated investment objective.
However, frequent mandatory disclosure may result in the fund to be targeted by
front-runners and copycats. A common theme that is analysed in all three chapters is
how mandatory disclosure affects the strategic behavior and performance of institu-
tional investors. Besides the impact on institutional investors, mandatory disclosure
has other market-wide effects on price informativeness and liquidity.
Mandatory disclosure could potentially have a negative impact on the trading
strategy of a fund manager that seeks to accumulate a huge position of an asset. To
reduce the market impact of such a huge trade, the fund manager would prefer to
spread his acquisition program over a longer period, e.g. over two or more quarters.
However, the fund manager also has to take into account the possible market impact
that the disclosure of holdings after the first quarter would have on the asset price.
To protect the interests of the fund manager and its fund investors, the SEC gives the
fund manager the option to apply for confidential treatment. This aspect of market
microstructure is the focus of the Chapter 1. Chapter 1 presents a theoretical model
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that examines the trading strategy and expected profits of an informed fund manager
that applies for confidential treatment. This model is closely related to Kyle (1985)
and Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001). In a two-period Kyle (1985) model, an
informed agent trades strategically over two periods, while in a two-period Huddart
et al. (2001) model, the informed agent is required to disclose his first trade before
trading commences in the second period. The market-maker adjusts the price of
the asset upon the disclosure of the first trade. If the probability of obtaining SEC
approval for confidential treatment is zero, Chapter 1’s model is equivalent to a two-
period Huddart et al. (2001). On the other hand, if the probability of obtaining
approval is one, the model is equivalent to a two-period Kyle (1985). The SEC
requires the manager to present a coherent on-going trading program in his request
for confidential treatment. If his request is granted, he is restricted to trade in a
manner consistent with his reported forecast in the subsequent period. The model
predicts that the price impact of a disclosed trade due to a confidential treatment
request denial is greater than that of a disclosed trade where there is no request.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model that analyses the impact of copycats that
track the trades of an informed fund manager. This model also uses a framework
similar to Kyle (1985) and Huddart et. al (2001). The key difference is that the
copycats are able to identify the disclosed trades of the informed fund manager while
the market-maker is not able to. The number of copycats can be interpreted as a mea-
sure of media exposure of the fund manager. As the number of copycats approaches
infinity, the model is equivalent to a two-period Huddart et al. (2001).
An important part of the first 2 Chapters is devoted to the analysis of the expected
profits of the institutional investor that faces mandatory disclosure. In Chapter 3, an
empirical study is conducted to see how more frequent portfolio disclosure impacts
mutual funds’ performance. In 2004, SEC increased the frequency of mandatory dis-
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closure to quarterly from semi-annual previously. This chapter uses this change in
regulation as a natural experiment to see whether the performance of the mutual
funds is negatively affected by more frequent disclosure. Prior to the policy change,
semi-annual funds with high abnormal returns in the past year outperform the cor-
responding quarterly funds. This difference in performance disappears after 2004.
The reduction in performance is higher for semi-annual funds holding illiquid assets.
These results support the hypothesis that funds with more disclosure suffers more
from activities such as front-running.
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Chapter 1
Confidential Treatment Requests
1.1 Introduction
Regular mandatory disclosure of holdings by institutional investors allows fund in-
vestors to better evaluate the performance of the funds and help them in their asset
allocation and diversification decision. However, it also has its drawbacks1. Specif-
ically, other market participants may copy the trades of the investment managers
and thus free-ride on the latter’s research expertise. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and
Shoven (2004), and Wang and Verbeek (2010) use the term copycat funds to describe
these investors2. The mimicking trades of these copycats would make it more expen-
sive for the investment managers if they decide to acquire more shares in subsequent
quarters. This may have negative consequences on informational efficiency of markets
1See Wermers (2001) on a discussion of how more frequent mandatory disclosure of mutual funds
could potentially reduce their profits.
2Frank et al. (2004) provide empirical evidence that after expenses, copycat funds earned sta-
tistically indistinguishable and possibly higher returns. They argue that if investors buy actively
managed funds to obtain high net-of-expenses returns, then copycat funds could potentially erode
their market share by offering comparable returns net of expenses. Wang and Verbeek (2010) show
that the relative success of copycat funds have improved after 2004, when the SEC increased the
mandatory disclosure frequency to quarterly from semi-annual previously.
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if mandatory disclosure reduces the information acquisition efforts of institutional in-
vestors. To balance the competing interests, a provision in Section 13(f) allows them
to seek confidential treatment for some of their holdings. If approved by the SEC,
these holdings will be disclosed at a later date, usually up to one year.
We show that confidential treatment requests impacts the trading strategy and
expected profits of institutional investors and the price informativeness of disclosed
trades. In this model, we examine the trading strategy of an informed investment
manager when he applies for confidential treatment. We assume that the manager
seeks confidential treatment on his initial trade to better exploit his private informa-
tion on the asset over two trading periods3. The manager trades in the first period
and applies for confidential treatment on this trade. The SEC decides whether to ap-
prove this request before the manager trades in the second period. The model most
similar to ours is Huddart, Hughes and Levine (2001). Their model is an extension of
Kyle (1985) with mandatory disclosure of trades. A perfectly informed risk-neutral
insider’s trades include a random noise component to disguise the information-based
component of the trades when they are publicly disclosed. This diminishes the mar-
ket maker’s ability to draw inferences on the insider’s information from his disclosed
trades. The insider therefore does not surrender his entire informational advantage
after his first trade is disclosed. The authors term this trading strategy dissimulation.
Other theoretical papers with variations of this dissimulation strategy include Zhang
(2004, 2008), Huang (2008) and Buffa (2010).
In our model, it follows that the manager cannot report the true fair value to
the SEC and use Huddart et al. (2001)’s dissimulation strategy at the same time.
According to current SEC regulatory guidelines on confidential treatment requests,
3There are other possible motives for confidential treatment requests, which are beyond the scope
of this paper. They include manipulation (see Fishman and Hagerty (1995), and John and Narayanan
(1997)) and window-dressing (see Musto (1997, 1999), and Meier and Schaumburg (2006)).
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the fund manager needs to detail a specific on-going investment program in his ap-
plication. The trade that he wants to delay disclosure therefore needs to be coherent
with the investment objective he reports to the SEC. For example, suppose the initial
price of the asset before he made his first trade is 10 and he reports the true fair
value of 30 to the SEC, his first trade needs to be a buy for the investment program
to be coherent. Adding a dissimulation noise term in the first trade may result in a
sell instead of a buy. This would result in the SEC rejecting the application.
We find that the equilibrium strategy of the manager is to dissimulate his reported
estimate of the fair value to the SEC. Back to the above example, it means that
he reports to the SEC a noisy signal that is a sum of the true fair value and a
random normally distributed noise term. This random noise term is proportional to
the unconditional variance of the fair value. Given this reported noisy signal, the
manager has an estimate of the fair value, using the projection theorem of normal
random variables. In the event that confidential treatment is denied, the random
noise term prevents the market-maker from perfectly inferring the true fair value.
Similar to Huddart et al. (2001), no invertible trading strategy can be part of a Nash
equilibrium if the manager does not add noise to the true fair value. Suppose the
manager reports the true fair value to the SEC. The market-maker will set a perfectly
elastic price in the event that the application is rejected and the manager’s trade is
disclosed. The manager thus would have an incentive to deviate from reporting the
true fair value, and make infinite trading profits in the second period if his application
is rejected.
Besides the initial trade, we also assume that the manager’s subsequent trade
is coherent with the reported estimate of the fair value of the asset, in the event
confidential treatment is granted. Let us suppose that the manager knows that the
true fair value is 20, the estimate he reported to the SEC is 30 and the price in the
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first round of trading is 25. The manager is committed to buy in the second period if
he is granted confidential treatment, even though he is expected to make a loss if he
does so. We assume that non-compliance of the reported investment program would
result in punitive costs in the form of rejections in future applications by the SEC.
We believe that this assumption is reasonable as the second trade is also observable
by the SEC. In addition, Agarwal, Jiang, Tang and Yang (2011) provide empirical
evidence that past confidential treatment denial rates is the single most important
predictor of future denial rates. Therefore it is important for managers to have a good
filing track record as it would affect the probability of success in future applications.
Although the granting of confidential treatment prevents the market-maker from
inferring the manager’s signal from his trade, the commitment to the reported invest-
ment program to the SEC reduces his expected profits. This is because the manager
would not be able to fully exploit his knowledge of the true fair value in the event his
application for confidential treatment is granted. We find that if the probability of
application success is below a certain threshold, the expected profits of the manager
is lower than in a scenario where he always discloses his trades, as in Huddart et al.
(2001).
To our knowledge, this is the first theoretical paper that examines the impact of
confidential treatment requests on the trading strategies by informed traders. The
empirical literature is also relatively new as databases of institutional holdings like
Thomson Reuters Ownership Data generally do not include data on confidential hold-
ings. Agarwal et al. (2011), and Aragon, Hertzel and Shi (2011) are two empirical
studies that examine confidential treatment filings. Compared to other investment
managers, hedge funds are the most aggressive applicants for confidential treatment
of their trades. Both papers document that confidential holdings exhibit superior
performance. The first paper also finds a significant positive market reaction after
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the involuntary disclosure of hedge funds’ holdings due to quick rejections of con-
fidential treatment requests by the SEC. The authors conclude that the rejections
force the revelation of information that has not been reflected in the stock prices, and
this may disrupt the funds’ stock acquisition strategies. Their findings support the
assumption in our model that confidential treatment applications are primarily for
protecting private information. This is in contrast to Cao (2011) who finds evidence
that investment firms with poor past trading performance use confidential treatment
to hide the liquidation of stocks in their portfolio that have performed poorly. Our
model assumes that the manager does not have such window-dressing motives.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.2 discusses the SEC
regulatory guidelines on confidential treatment requests. Section 1.3 describes the
model under 2 different scenarios. In the first scenario, the SEC restricts the man-
ager’s second period trade such that it is consistent with his reported forecast, in
the event confidential treatment is granted. We believe that this scenario is the best
depiction of current SEC regulations. We also examine the case where there is no
restriction on the manager’s second period trade. Comparative statics is discussed in
Section 1.4, where we compare the model against a two-period Huddart et al. (2001)
and a two-period Kyle (1985) model. Section 1.5 concludes.
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1.2 SEC Regulatory Guidelines on Confidential Treat-
ment Requests
Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires investment managers
(who manage more than US$100 million in assets) to publicly disclose their portfolio
holdings within 45 days after the end of every quarter. Section 13(f) was enacted
by Congress in 1975 to allow the public to have access to the information regarding
the purchase, sale and holdings of securities by institutional investors. However, the
mandatory disclosure of holdings before an ongoing investment program is complete
would be detrimental to the interests of the institutional investor and its fund in-
vestors. To balance these competing interests, the SEC allows institutional investors
to apply for confidential treatment.
Generally, confidential treatment requests are granted if the investment manager
can demonstrate that confidential treatment is in the public interest or for the pro-
tection of the investors. According to the SEC4, there are several key criteria that
the manager needs to fulfill for his confidential treatment request to be successful.
Firstly, the manager needs to detail a specific investment program. He needs to pro-
vide the SEC information regarding the program’s ultimate objective and describe
the measures taken during that quarter toward effectuating the program. He also
needs to provide information on the trades that are made in that quarter to support
the existence of the program. Secondly, the investment program must be an on-going
one that continues through the date of the filing. Thirdly, the manager must show
that the disclosure of the fund’s holdings would reveal the investment strategy to the
public. Lastly, he must demonstrate that failure to grant confidential treatment to the
4See http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/13fpt2.htm for a description of the ap-
plication process for confidential treatment. These rules were introduced in 1998 to prevent invest-
ment managers to use confidential treatment requests as a tool to manipulate the market.
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holdings would harm the fund’s performance. This would include lost profit opportu-
nities due to mimicking strategies of other copycat investors as well as front-running
activities by other market participants. If the manager’s application is unsuccessful,
he is required to disclose the holdings within 6 business days.
We attempt to explicitly model the above guidelines. We assume that an informed
investment manager details a “a specific investment program” by submitting to the
SEC his signal of the fair value of the asset. This signal can be interpreted as a target
price for the manager. The manager also needs to submit a trade that he has already
made in the previous quarter which is consistent with the target price. In the event
he is granted confidential treatment, he has to continue trading in the subsequent
period in a manner that is consistent with the original target price. This is because
the investment program is an “on-going” one.
The SEC application guidelines for confidential treatment requests imply that the
trades are typically large trades5 that have huge price impact and are done over more
than one quarter. The SEC receives about 60 such requests every quarter. A recent
example is Berkshire Hathaway’s (Warren Buffett’s investment holding company)
purchase of a 5.5% stake in IBM worth US$10 billion in 20116. The SEC allowed the
company to defer disclosure of the IBM trades by a quarter. Without confidential
treatment being granted, it is likely that the purchase would be more costly.
It is noted that the granting of confidential treatment by the SEC is not a guar-
anteed event. In their sample of confidential treatment requests from 1999 to 2007,
Agarwal et al (2001), report that 17.4% were denied by the SEC. Even applications
by well-known investors like Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway have previously
5In Agarwal et al.(2011)’s sample, the average confidential holding represents 1.25% of all the
shares outstanding by the issuer compared to the average of 0.68% for disclosed holdings.
6http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/14/one-secret-buffett-gets-to-keep/
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been rejected7, with a 72.3% rejection rate from 65 applications. The distribution of
rejection rates shows considerable variation across managers.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Set-up
This Kyle (1985)-type model employs a setting similar to the two-period model in
Huddart et al. (2001). There are two trading periods indexed by n ∈ {1, 2}. The
discount rate is normalised to zero for simplicity. There is one risky asset in the
market with a liquidation value of v, where v ∼ N (P0,Σ0). v is realised after the
second trading period. There are liquidity traders who summit exogenously generated
orders un in each trading period, where un ∼ N (0, σ2u). We assume that u1, u2 and
v are all mutually independent.
A risk-neutral informed investment manager observes v perfectly before trading
commences. He decides to apply for confidential treatment for his first period trade
before making the trade. He trades x1 in the first period and declares to the SEC that
he has a signal θ of the asset value. Let D denote the event in which the first period
trade is disclosed (application is unsuccessful) and N denote the event in which the
trade is not disclosed (application is successful)8. The application for confidential
treatment is successful with a probability of α. The manager trades xN2 (x
D
2 ) in the
second period if the application is successful (unsuccessful).
There exists a competitive risk neutral market maker who sets prices. He cannot
7See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aNd pTpcmBwA&refer=news index
8Similar to Huddart et al. (2001), since trading occurs only once for every reporting period, the
disclosure of holdings is equivalent to the disclosure of trades.
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distinguish the trades of the manager from the other uninformed orders of the liquidity
traders. He only observes the aggregate order flow yn in each period and sets the
price to be equal to the posterior expectation of v. The price is therefore semi-
strong efficient and the market-maker makes zero expected profits due to Bertrand
competition with potential rival market-makers. In the event that the manager’s first
period trade is disclosed, the market-maker updates his expectation of v to P ∗1 from
the first period price P1 before trading commences in the second period. Conversely,
if there is no disclosure, the market-maker infers that confidential treatment has been
granted.
If the manager decides to apply for confidential treatment, we show that an equi-
librium exists where he declares to the SEC that he has a signal θ, where θ = v + η,
η ∼ N (0, σ2η), and η is distributed independently of v and un. η is the noise term
that the manager adds to v when he applies for confidential treatment. Given θ, his
reported forecast of v is v′. According to the projection theorem of normal random
variables,
v′ = P0 +
Σ0
Σ0 + σ2η
(θ − P0) (1.1)
As mentioned earlier, to stand any chance of getting SEC approval for confidential
treatment, the manager needs to report a coherent on-going trading program. This
means that his first period trade x1 must be consistent with v
′. If his application
is successful, his second period trade also needs to be consistent with v′ and not
v. Using backward induction, this means that the manager chooses xN2 to maximise
his expected second period profits E (pi2) as if his signal is v
′ instead of v. His
maximisation problem is
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xN2 ∈ arg max
xN2
E (pi2|v′) (1.2)
Referring to the numerical example described in the introduction, we have P0 = 10,
P1 = 25, v = 20 and v
′ = 30. The manager is committed to buy in the second period
(since v′ > P1) even though he would make an expected loss in this trade (since
v < P1). If the application is rejected, the informed trader is forced to disclose
his first period trade before trading commences in the second period. However, the
informed trader is now free to make use of his knowledge of v in his second period
trade xD2 as his trading strategy is now not bounded by the confidential treatment
request. In contrast to (1.2), the maximisation problem is now
xD2 ∈ arg max
xD2
E (pi2|v) (1.3)
We define ΣN1 and Σ
D
1 as the amount of private information that the manager can
exploit in the second period of trading, in the event that confidential treatment is
granted and not granted respectively
ΣN1 = var (v
′|y1) = var (v′ − P1) (1.4)
ΣD1 = var (v|x1) = var (v − v′) (1.5)
Fig 1.1 shows the timeline of the model.
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Figure 1.1: Timeline of Events of Confidential Treatment Request
1.3.2 SEC restricts the manager’s second period trade after
confidential treatment is granted
Proposition 1.1 If the investment manager applies for confidential treatment and
the SEC restricts his second period trade in the event confidential treatment is granted,
a subgame perfect linear equilibrium exists in which
1. The manager submits his noisy signal θ to the SEC whereby
θ = v + η, η ∼ N (0, σ2η) σ2η = hΣ0
where 0 ≤ h ≤ 1 is the only real positive root of the following equation, such that
λ1 > 0, λ
D
2 > 0, λ
N
2 > 0(
(1− α)2 − h)√(1− α)2 + h− α (1− α)2√h = 0
2. The manager’s trading strategies and expected profits are of the linear form
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x1 = β1 (v
′ − P0)
β1 =
σu√
Σ0
√
h(1+h)
(1−α) λ1 =
√
Σ0
σu
(1−α)
((1−α)2+h)
√
h
1+h
xD2 = β
D
2 (v − v′) ΣD1 = h1+hΣ0
xN2 = β
N
2 (v
′ − P1) ΣN1 = (1−α)
2
(1+h)((1−α)2+h)Σ0
βD2 =
σu√
ΣD1
λD2 =
√
ΣD1
2σu
βN2 =
σu√
ΣN1
λN2 =
√
ΣN1
2σu
E (pi1) =
β1(1−λ1β1)Σ0
1+h
E
(
piN2
)
=
σu
√
ΣN1
2
E
(
piD2
)
=
σu
√
ΣD1
2
3. The market-maker’s pricing rule is of the linear form
P1 = P0 + λ1y1
P ∗1 = v
′
PD2 = v
′ + λD2 y
D
2
PN2 = P1 + λ
N
2 y
N
2
Proof: See Appendix 1.7.1
The main intuition of the proof is as follows. After computing xN2 and x
D
2 , by
backward induction, we derive the total expected profits in both periods and then
take the first order condition with respect to x1. The first order condition equation
will be in terms of v − P0 and x1. Following from Huddart et al. (2001), for the
mixed strategy θ = v + η, η ∼ N (0, σ2η) to hold in equilibrium, the manager must
be different across all values of x1, as x1 is a function of θ. The coefficients of v − P0
and x1 must therefore be zero, resulting in two simultaneous equations. The other
parameters can then be solved.
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The variance of the noise σ2η that the manager adds to the forecast he submits
to the SEC is directly proportional to the unconditional variance of the fair value
Σ0. In the event that confidential treatment is granted, the second period trade
xN2 = β
N
2 (v
′ − P1) is a linear function of v′, in spite of the manager knowing that
the true fair value is v. On the other hand, if the confidential treatment request is
denied, the manager’s second period trade is xD2 = β
D
2 (v − v′) as the manager is now
free to make use of his knowledge of v.
The market-maker is able to infer v′ perfectly from x1 because x1 is a linear
function of v′−P0. He updates his expectation of v to P ∗1 = v′ from P1 before trading
commences in the second period.
1.3.3 SEC does not restrict the manager’s second period
trade
In the next proposition, we will examine the manager’s equilibrium trading strategy
if the SEC does not restrict his second period trade when confidential treatment is
granted. The manager is free to use his knowledge of v in his second period trade.
We add an upper hat to the endogenous parameters in this equilibrium to distinguish
them from those in Proposition 1.1. Therefore in contrast to (1.2), the manager’s
maximisation problem in the second period when confidential treatment is granted is
x̂N2 ∈ arg max
x̂N2
E (pi2|v) (1.6)
Proposition 1.2 If the investment manager applies for confidential treatment and
the SEC does not restrict his second period trade, a subgame perfect linear equilibrium
exists in which
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1. The manager submits his noisy forecast θ̂ to the SEC whereby
θ̂ = v + η̂, η̂ ∼ N (0, σ̂2η) σ̂2η = gΣ0
where 0 ≤ g ≤ 1 is the only real positive root of the following equation, such that
λ̂1 > 0, λ̂
D
2 > 0, λ̂
N
2 > 0
α
√
g
g+1
− (1− α)
(
g2/3 (1− α)−4/3 − 1
)√ g2/3
1+g
(1−α)2/3+1
g−1/3(1−α)2/3+1= 0
2. The manager’s trading strategies and expected profits are of the linear form
x̂1 = β̂1 (v̂
′ − P0)
β̂1 =
σu√
Σ0
(
1−α√
g
)1/3√
1 + g λ̂1 =
√
Σ0(1−α)
σu
(
1−α√
g
)1/3
(g1/3(1−α)1/3+1−α)√1+g
x̂D2 = β̂
D
2 (v − v̂′) Σ̂D1 = g1+gΣ0
x̂N2 = β̂
N
2
(
v − P̂1
)
Σ̂N1 =
g
1+g
(
1−α√
g
)2/3
+1(
1−α√
g
)2/3
+1
Σ0
β̂
D
2 =
σu√
Σ̂D1
λ̂
D
2 =
√
Σ̂D1
2σu
β̂
N
2 =
σu√
Σ̂N1
λ̂
N
2 =
√
Σ̂N1
2σu
E (pi1) =
β̂1(1−λ̂1β̂1)Σ0
1+g
E
(
piN2
)
=
σu
√
Σ̂N1
2
E
(
piD2
)
=
σu
√
Σ̂D1
2
3. The market-maker’s pricing rule is of the linear form
P̂1 = P0 + λ̂1ŷ1
P̂ ∗1 = v̂
′
P̂D2 = v̂
′ + λ̂
D
2 ŷ
D
2
P̂N2 = P̂1 + λ̂
N
2 ŷ
N
2
Proof: See Appendix 1.7.2
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Since the manager is free to use his knowledge of v, his second period trade given
confidential treatment is x̂N2 = β̂
N
2
(
v − P̂1
)
instead of β̂
N
2
(
v′ − P̂1
)
. Similar to the
result in Proposition 1.1, the variance of the noise σ̂2η that the manager adds to the
forecast he submits to the SEC is also directly proportional to the unconditional
variance of the fair value Σ0.
Corollary 1.3 Under both scenarios in Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, a) if α = 0, the
equilibrium is equivalent to a two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model; b) if α = 1, the
equilibrium is equivalent to a two-period Kyle (1985) model.
If α = 0, the manager has no chance of getting confidential treatment. Therefore
he always discloses his first period trade and this is equivalent to a two-period Huddart
et. al (2001) model. The manager adds η to v when he reports his signal to the
SEC, where σ2η = Σ0. The manager’s first period of trade has the same amount of
dissimulation as in a two-period Huddart et. al (2001) model9. Similarly, if α = 1,
the manager is always successful in getting confidential treatment. His first period
trade is x1 = β1 (v − P0) and he reports θ = v to the SEC. His second period is
x2 = β
N
2 (v − P1) as this is consistent with his reported signal v to the SEC. This
scenario is thus equivalent to a two-period Kyle (1985) model.
9The first period trade in a two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model is x1 = β1 (v − P0) + z1,
where z1 is the dissimulation term that has a variance of
σ2u
2 . In Proposition 1.1, the first period
trade can be expressed as x1 =
β1Σ0
Σ0+σ2η
(v − P0) + β1Σ0Σ0+σ2η η. It follows that if σ
2
η = Σ0, the equilibrium
in Proposition 1.1 is equivalent to Huddart et al. (2001)’s. The same applies for Proposition 1.2
too.
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1.4 Comparative Statics
In this section, we will focus on analysing the parameters in Proposition 1 and 2. We
first compare the total expected profits against those that the manager is expected
to receive if he always discloses his initial trade.
1.4.1 Manager’s Profits
Proposition 1.4 Compared with the expected profits where the manager always dis-
closes his initial trade (as in Huddart et al. (2001)), a) if the SEC restricts the
second period trade in the event confidential treatment is granted, the manager’s ex-
pected profits will be lower if 0 ≤ α ≤ α∗, where α∗ ≈ 0.361; b) if the SEC does not
restrict the second period trade, the manager’s expected profits will be always higher
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
Proof: See Appendix 1.7.3
Fig 1.2 shows the total expected profits (over the two periods) of the manager when
he applies for confidential treatment, under the scenarios in Propositions 1.1 and 1.2.
The total expected profits under the two-period Huddart et al. (2001) equilibrium
is σu
√
Σ0
2
, while those of a two-period Kyle (1985)10 is approximately 0.878σu
√
Σ0.
As discussed in Corollary 1.3, the equilibrium under both scenarios is equivalent to
a two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model if α = 0, and a two-period Kyle (1985)
model if α = 1. For all values of α between 0 and 1, the total expected profits in
the equilibrium with no second period trade restriction is higher than σu
√
Σ0
2
. On
10See Huddart et al. (2001). The paper’s Proposition 2 shows the expected profits of a two-
period Huddart et al. (2001) dissimulation equilibrium, while Proposition 1 shows the expected
profits in a two-period Kyle (1985) model. Note that there is a typo in Proposition 1: E (pi1) =√
2K(K−1)
4K−1 σu
√
Σ0 instead of E (pi1) =
2K(K−1)
(4K−1)2 σu
√
Σ0.
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Figure 1.2: Total Expected Profits of Manager Under the 2 Different Assumptions
the other hand, in the equilibrium with the second period trade restriction, the total
expected profits are lower than σu
√
Σ0
2
for 0 ≤ α ≤ α∗.
To understand why the manager might have lower expected profits if he applies for
confidential treatment in the scenario in Proposition 1.1, let us examine the expected
profits in both periods separately. Fig 1.3 shows the comparison of the expected
profits of the manager in the scenarios of Proposition 1.1 and 1.2 against those of a
Figure 1.3: Comparison of Expected Profits with Two-period Huddart et al. (2001) Model
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two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model, where the insider always discloses his first
trade. In their model, the informed insider earns the same expected profits σu
2
√
Σ0
2
in both periods. In our model under both scenarios, the manager always earns higher
expected profits in the first period, i.e. E (pi1) ≥ σu2
√
Σ0
2
and E (pi1) ≥ σu2
√
Σ0
2
.
This is because both σ2η and σ̂
2
η are less than Σ0, implying that the manager is more
aggressive in exploiting his information in the first period. In the second period, in
the event that confidential treatment is denied, the disclosure of the first period trade
results in both E
(
piD2
)
and E
(
piD2
)
to be lower than σu
2
√
Σ0
2
. This is because the
market-maker updates the price to reflect the information contained in the disclosed
trade, reducing the information advantage that the manager can exploit in the second
period.
Figure 1.4: Expected Profits of Manager in the 2 Trading Periods under the Assumption that
the SEC Restricts the Second Period Trade if Confidential Treatment Request is Successful
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The comparison results diverge in the event that confidential treatment is granted.
We find that E
(
piN2
) ≥ σu
2
√
Σ0
2
for all values of α between 0 and 1, while E
(
piN2
) ≤
σu
2
√
Σ0
2
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.485. Under the scenario in Proposition 1.1, the manager is only
able to trade based on his knowledge of v′ instead of v. His information advantage in
the second period is therefore reduced with this restriction. The reduction in expected
profits in E
(
piN2
)
causes E (pi2) ≤ σu2
√
Σ0
2
for 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.854. Figure 1.4 shows the
breakdown in the expected profits of the manager in Proposition 1.1 graphically.
As discussed earlier, ΣD1 and Σ
N
1 measure the amount of private information that
the manager can exploit in the second period of trading. These parameters are related
to the second period expected profits since E
(
piD2
)
=
σu
√
ΣD1
2
and E
(
piN2
)
=
σu
√
ΣN1
2
.
It appears that ΣN1 should always be greater than Σ
D
1 since disclosing the first period
trade will result in a loss in the information advantage of the manager. However, if
confidential treatment is not granted, the manager can make use of his knowledge of
v, while if it is granted, he can only exploit his knowledge of v′. Fig 1.5 shows the
relationship between ΣD1 , Σ
N
1 and E (Σ1) = αΣ
N
1 + (1− α) ΣD1 with α. Interestingly,
we find that ΣD1 > Σ
N
1 for 0 ≤ α ≤ 0.209. In contrast, in the scenario where the SEC
does not restrict the manager’s second period trade, we find that Σ̂D1 < Σ̂
N
1 for all
values of α between 0 and 1. This is shown in Fig 1.6.
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Figure 1.5: Information Advantage of Manager in the 2nd Period under the Assumption that
the SEC Restricts the Second Period Trade if Confidential Treatment Request is Successful
1.4.2 Noise Added to Reported Forecast to the SEC
Corollary 1.5 a) Under both scenarios in Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, the manager
adds less noise to his reported forecast to the SEC as α increases. b) The manager
adds less noise in the equilibrium in Proposition 1.1 compared to that in Proposition
1.2.
Fig 1.7 shows the relationship between α and the noise that the manager adds
to the forecast that he submits to the SEC. As α increases, the manager adds less
noise to the forecast, i.e. both
dσ2η
dα
and
dσ̂2η
dα
are negative. This is because adding more
noise in the forecast would be more beneficial to the manager ex-post, in the event
that his application is rejected. If α = 1, the equilibrium is a two-period Kyle (1985)
model where there is no noise (the manager reports the true fair value of v to the
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Figure 1.6: Information Advantage of Manager in the 2nd Period under the Assumption
that the SEC does not Restrict the Second Period Trade
SEC), while if α = 0, the equilibrium is a two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model
where the noise term is Σ0. In addition, we note that σ
2
η ≤ σ̂2η for all values of α
between 0 and 1. Adding more noise to the forecast would result in a v′ that varies
more from the true fair value v. If the SEC forces the manager to trade based on the
reported v′ in the event that confidential treatment is granted, the manager would
forgo substantial trading profits if he adds too much noise in his application in the
first period. The restriction on the second period trade therefore forces the manager
to be more truthful in the forecast that he submits to the SEC.
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Figure 1.7: Noise Added to the Forecast by Manager in his Confidential Treatment Request
under the 2 Different Assumptions
1.4.3 Price Impact of Disclosed Trade
Upon facing a rejection of the confidential treatment request, the manager needs to
disclose his first period trade. The market-maker updates the price from P1 to P
∗
1 = v
′
before trading commences in the second period. The price impact of the disclosed
trade is
E
(
v′ − P1
x1
)
=
1
β1
− λ1 (1.7)
The first period trade x1 thus has a price impact of λ1 on P1 and another price
impact of 1
β1
−λ1 when it is disclosed. Following from Proposition 2 in Huddart et al.
(2001), if the manager does not apply for confidential treatment, the corresponding
price impact of the disclosed trade is 1
2σu
√
Σ0
2
.
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Figure 1.8: Price Impact if Manager’s Trade is Disclosed due to Unsuccessful Confidential
Treatment Request under the 2 Different Assumptions
Fig 1.8 depicts the positive relationship between the price impact of the disclosed
trade and α. The price impact due to a confidential treatment request denial is
greater than that of a voluntarily disclosed trade (where α = 0). If managers with
a better market reputation of uncovering the fair value of stocks like Warren Buffett
are assigned a higher α, then it follows that their disclosed trades due to confidential
treatment denials will result in a larger price impact. In addition, we note that the
price impact under the scenario where the SEC restricts the second period trade is
greater than the price impact under the scenario where there are no restrictions, i.e.
1
β1
− λ1 ≥ 1β̂1 − λ̂1. This follows from Fig 1.7, as the manager adds less noise under
the first scenario and therefore the disclosed trade is more informative.
Agarwal et al. (2011) document a significant positive market reaction associated
with involuntary disclosure of positions due to relatively quick confidential treatment
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denials11 by the SEC. The authors attribute the market reaction as evidence support-
ing the private information motive of confidential treatment requests. The results of
our model imply that the market reaction would be greater for managers with higher
α.
1.4.4 Liquidity
We next examine the welfare implications of liquidity traders if the manager applies
for confidential treatment. Compared to the case where the manager always dis-
closes his initial trade, confidential treatment implies greater information asymmetry
between the manager and the market maker. We would expect greater transaction
costs for liquidity traders as market depth decreases. Fig 1.9 depicts the relationship
between α and the market-maker’s liquidity parameters in Proposition 1.1. In the
two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model, λ1 = λ2 =
1
2σu
√
Σ0
2
. Since the liquidity
parameters in the second period λN2 and λ
D
2 are different and liquidity traders by
definition cannot choose when they can trade, we compute the expected value of the
liquidity parameter in the second period: E (λ2) = αλ
N
2 + (1− α)λD2 . It can be seen
that λ1 ≥ 12σu
√
Σ0
2
for all values of α, while that is not true for E (λ2). However the
average liquidity parameter λ1+E(λ2)
2
over the two periods is greater than 1
2σu
√
Σ0
2
for
α ≥ α∗. We therefore conclude that liquidity traders are worse off if the investment
manager applies for confidential treatment. We also arrive at the same conclusion
when there is no restriction in the second period trade by the SEC, as shown in Fig
1.10. In this scenario, even E
(
λ̂2
)
is greater than 1
2σu
√
Σ0
2
.
11They classify these quick denials as filings that are denied within 45-180 days after the quarter-
end portfolio date.
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Figure 1.9: Liquidity Parameter under the Assumption that the SEC Restricts the Second
Period Trade if Confidential Treatment Request is Successful
1.4.5 Potential Policy Change
Under current SEC policy, the manager needs to make the initial trade before he
submits his confidential treatment request, to prove that the trade is part of an
ongoing trading program. As discussed earlier, the manager faces the risk that the
application is rejected and the trade is disclosed. A potential policy change that
increases the manager’s welfare would be for him to apply for confidential treatment
and the SEC making the decision on the request before trading commences. Similar to
the scenario in Proposition 1.2 where there is no restriction on the manager’s second
period trade, he would always apply for confidential treatment. The manager would
be in a two-period Kyle (1985) equilibrium with probability α, and Huddart et. al
(2001) equilibrium with probability 1−α. The manager’s profit functions under both
scenarios in Propositions 1.1 and 1.2 are convex in α (see Fig 1.2) for 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. This
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Figure 1.10: Liquidity Parameter under the Assumption that the SEC does not Restrict
the Second Period Trade
is because in the event of a successful application, he does not forgo any expected
profits by adding noise in the initial trade, unlike the earlier scenarios. Therefore the
manager would be better off with this change in policy. Correspondingly, expected
liquidity falls and noise traders are worse off.
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1.5 Conclusion
The primary contribution of this paper is a theoretical model which describes market
microstructure with confidential treatment requests of trades by investment man-
agers. These trades are typically large ones that have huge price impact and are done
over more than one quarter. The key feature we capture is that the SEC requires
the manager to present a coherent on-going trading program in his application for
confidential treatment. In the event his confidential treatment request is granted,
he has to trade in a manner consistent with his reported forecast in the subsequent
period. We assume that failure to do so would result in future rejections by the SEC
and model this as an exogenous restriction in the manager’s second period trade.
Analogous to Huddart et al.’s (2001) dissimulation trading strategy, in equilibrium,
the manager adds noise to the forecast that he reports to the SEC.
Our model explains various stylized facts described in the empirical literature.
Although all investors can apply for confidential treatment, not everybody does. Fur-
thermore, when they do apply, they are not always successful. Our model predicts
that with the SEC restriction in the second period, managers only earn higher ex-
pected profits if their probability of successful application is higher than a certain
threshold. If there is no such restriction, expected profits would always be higher.
This is consistent with managers having heterogeneous probabilities of success. For
instance, funds that employ quantitative and statistical arbitrage trading strategies
involving multiple assets may find it more difficult to convince the SEC that disclo-
sure would reveal the trading strategy to the public and harm its performance12. This
12See http://sec.gov/rules/other/34-52134.pdf. It is a rejection letter issued by the SEC on Two
Sigma Investments LLC confidential treatment request in 2005. The fund uses trading strategies
based on statistical models. In another case, D.E. Shaw & Company, a large quant-oriented hedge
fund manager filed for confidential treatment for its entire second quarter portfolio in 2007. Their
request was rejected and they were forced to disclose their whole portfolio valued at US$79 billion.
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is because the SEC will only grant confidential treatment on a position-by-position
basis. In addition, Agarwal et al. (2011) report that hedge funds with higher past re-
jection rates are more likely to be rejected again in future applications which supports
the assertion that the probability of success is a fund characteristic.
Aragon et al. (2011) and Agarwal et al. (2011) both find confidential holdings
of hedge funds yield superior performance. In our model, trading after a successful
application has higher expected profits whenever managers find it ex ante optimal to
apply. Agarwal et al. (2011) further report a significant positive market reaction after
the involuntary disclosure of hedge funds’ trades following rejections of confidential
treatment requests. We also find that in our model. The noise that the manager
adds to the first period trade successfully obscures some of his private information
which can be exploited in the second period. However, a failed application reveals
this information and prices react accordingly.
Finally, we examine the impact of confidential treatment provisions on market
liquidity and the welfare of liquidity traders. We find that market depth is lower
when the manager applies for confidential treatment. Liquidity traders will be worse
off.
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1.7 Appendix
1.7.1 Proof of Proposition 1.1
If the application is not successful, his first period trade will be disclosed. The market-
maker observes x1 and is able to infer v
′ perfectly. The price of asset will be adjusted
to v′ before the second round of trading commences. Assume that
xD2 = β
D
2 (v − v′) (1.8)
PD2 = v
′ + λD2 y
D
2
If the application is successful, his first period trade will not be disclosed. Assume
that
xN2 = β
N
2 (v
′ − P1) (1.9)
PN2 = P1 + λ
N
2 y
N
2
The model is solved by backward induction. Let us first analyse the scenario in
which the application is not successful and the informed trader is forced to disclose
his first period trade. The informed trader maximises second period profits
E
[(
v − PD2
)
xD2 |v
]
= E
[(
v − v′ − λD2 xD2
)
xD2
]
Taking first order condition with respect to xD2 results in the following equations
xD2 =
1
2λD2
(v − v′)
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βD2 =
1
2λD2
(1.10)
E
[
piD2 (v
′, v)
]
=
1
4λD2
(v − v′)2
In the event that the application is successful, the informed trader has to choose
xN2 that is coherent with v
′. This means that xN2 is chosen such that it maximises
second period profits as if the informed trader has a signal v′.
E
[(
v − PN2
)
xN2 |v′
]
= E
[(
v′ − P1 − λN2 xN2
)
xN2
]
Taking first order condition with respect to xN2
xN2 =
1
2λN2
(v′ − P1)
βN2 =
1
2λN2
(1.11)
Since the informed trader knows v instead of v′, the expected profits in the second
period when confidential treatment is granted is
E
[
piN2 (P1, v
′) |v] = E [(v − PN2 )xN2 |v] = 1
2λN2
(
v − v
′
2
− P1
2
)
(v′ − P1)
Stepping back to the first period, the total expected profits in both periods is
E
[
(v − P1)x1 + (1− α) piD2 (v′, v) + αpiN2 (P1, v′) |v
]
= E
 (v−P 0 − λ1x1)x1 + 1−α4λD2
(
v − P0 − x1β1
)2
+ α
2λN2
(
v − P0− x12β1 −
λ1x1
2
)(
x1
β1
− λ1x1
)

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Taking first order condition with respect to x1
(v−P 0)
(
1− 1− α
2λD2 β1
+
α
2λN2
(
1
β1
− λ1
))
+x1
(
−2λ1 + 1− α
2λD2 β
2
1
− α
2λN2
(
1
β21
− λ21
))
= 0
The second-order condition is
−2λ1 + 1− α
2λD2 β
2
1
− α
2λN2
(
1
β21
− λ21
)
≤ 0
Following from Huddart et al. (2001), for the mixed strategy θ = v + η, η ∼
N
(
0, σ2η
)
to hold in equilibrium, the manager must be indifferent across all values of
x1, as x1 is a function of θ. We seek positive values of λ1, λ
D
2 and λ
N
2 such that
1− 1− α
2λD2 β1
+
α
2λN2
(
1
β1
− λ1
)
= 0
and
−2λ1 + 1− α
2λD2 β
2
1
− α
2λN2
(
1
β21
− λ21
)
= 0
Re-arranging terms,
β1 =
1
λ1
− 1− α
2λD2
(1.12)
and
β1 =
2λN2 − αλ1
λ1
(
4λN2 − αλ1
) (1.13)
Using the projection theorem of normal random variables on y1, y
N
2 and y
D
2 , we
obtain
λ1 =
β1Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ2η
β21Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ2η
+ σ2u
(1.14)
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ΣD1 =
σ2η
Σ0 + σ2η
Σ0 (1.15)
ΣN1 =
Σ20
Σ0 + σ2η
−
(
β1Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ2η
)2
β21Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ2η
+ σ2u
(1.16)
λD2 =
βD2 Σ
D
1
βD
2
2 Σ
D
1 + σ
2
u
(1.17)
λN2 =
βN2 Σ
N
1
βN
2
2 Σ
N
1 + σ
2
u
(1.18)
(1.10) and (1.17) imply
βD2 =
σu√
ΣD1
(1.19)
λD2 =
√
ΣD1
2σu
(1.20)
while (1.11) and (1.18) imply
βN2 =
σu√
ΣN1
(1.21)
λN2 =
√
ΣN1
2σu
(1.22)
Substituting (1.14), (1.15) and (1.20) into (1.12) gives us
β1 =
σuση
(1− α) Σ0
√
Σ0 + σ2η
Σ0
(1.23)
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λ1 =
(1− α) Σ0ση
σu
(
σ2η + (1− α)2 Σ0
)√ Σ0
Σ0 + σ2η
(1.24)
Substituting (1.16), (1.22), (1.23) and (1.24) into (1.13) results in the following
equation for σ2η
(
(1− α)2 − h)√h+ (1− α)2 − α (1− α)2√h = 0 (1.25)
where σ2η = hΣ0
Expected profits in first period
E (pi1) = E [(v − P1)x1|v]
= E [(v − P0 − λ1β1 (v′ − P0)) β1 (v′ − P0)]
= β1(1−λ1β1)Σ0
1+h
Expected profits in second period with successful application
E
(
piN2
)
= E
[(
v − PN2
)
xN2 |v
]
= E
[(
v − v′ + 1
2
(v′ − P1)
)
βN2 (v
′ − P1)
]
=
βN2 Σ
N
1
2
Expected profits in second period with unsuccessful application
E
(
piD2
)
= E
[(
v − PD2
)
xD2 |v
]
= E
[
1
2
βD2 (v − v′)2
]
=
βD2 Σ
D
1
2
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1.7.2 Proof of Proposition 1.2
If the manager’s second period trade is not enforced by the SEC in the event he is
granted confidential treatment, he is free to use v instead of v̂′. Therefore we have
x̂N2 = β̂
N
2
(
v − P̂1
)
(1.26)
E
[
piN2
(
P̂1, v
)
|v
]
= E
[(
v − P̂N2
)
x̂N2 |v
]
=
1
4λ̂
N
2
(
v − P̂1
)2
Similar to the proof in Proposition 1.1, we obtain
β̂
N
2 =
1
2λ̂
N
2
(1.27)
x̂D2 = β̂
D
2 (v − v̂′) (1.28)
β̂
D
2 =
1
2λ̂
D
2
(1.29)
Stepping back to the first period, the total expected profits in both periods is
E
[(
v − P̂1
)
x̂1 + (1− α) piD2 (v̂′, v) + αpiN2
(
P̂1, v
)
|v
]
= E
[(
v−P 0 − λ̂1x̂1
)
x̂1 +
1−α
4λ̂
D
2
(
v − P0 − x̂1β̂1
)2
+ α
4λ̂
N
2
(
v − P0−λ̂1x̂1
)2]
Taking first order condition with respect to x1
(v−P 0)
(
1− 1− α
2λ̂
D
2 β̂1
−αλ̂1
2λ̂
N
2
)
+ x̂1
(
−2λ̂1 + 1− α
2λ̂
D
2 β̂
2
1
+
αλ̂
2
1
2λ̂
N
2
)
= 0
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The second-order condition is
−2λ̂1 + 1− α
2λ̂
D
2 β̂
2
1
+
αλ̂
2
1
2λ̂
N
2
≤ 0
For the mixed strategy θ = v + η, η ∼ N (0, σ̂2η) to hold in equilibrium, the
manager must be different across all values of x̂1, as x̂1 is a function of θ. We seek
positive values of λ̂1, λ̂
D
2 and λ̂
N
2 such that
1− 1− α
2λ̂
D
2 β̂1
−αλ̂1
2λ̂
N
2
= 0
and
−2λ̂1 + 1− α
2λ̂
D
2 β̂
2
1
+
αλ̂
2
1
2λ̂
N
2
= 0
Re-arranging terms
β̂1 =
2λ̂
N
2 − αλ̂1
λ̂1
(
4λ̂
N
2 − αλ̂1
) (1.30)
λ̂1 =
1− α
β̂1
(
2λ̂
D
2 β̂1 + 1− α
) (1.31)
Using the projection theorem of normal random variables on ŷ1, ŷ
N
2 and ŷ
D
2 , we
obtain
λ̂1 =
β̂1Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ̂
2
η
β̂
2
1Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ̂
2
η
+ σ2u
(1.32)
Σ̂D1 =
σ̂2η
Σ0 + σ̂
2
η
Σ0 (1.33)
Σ̂N1 = Σ0−
(
β̂1Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ̂
2
η
)2
β̂
2
1Σ
2
0
Σ0+σ̂
2
η
+ σ̂2u
(1.34)
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λ̂
D
2 =
β̂
D
2 Σ̂
D
1
β̂
D2
2 Σ̂
D
1 + σ
2
u
(1.35)
λ̂
N
2 =
β̂
N
2 Σ̂
N
1
β̂
N2
2 Σ̂
N
1 + σ
2
u
(1.36)
(1.29) and (1.35) imply
β̂
D
2 =
σu√
Σ̂D1
(1.37)
λ̂
D
2 =
√
Σ̂D1
2σu
(1.38)
while (1.27) and (1.36) imply
β̂
N
2 =
σu√
Σ̂N1
(1.39)
λ̂
N
2 =
√
Σ̂N1
2σu
(1.40)
Substituting (1.32), (1.33) and (1.38) into (1.31) gives us
β̂1 = σu
(
1− α
Σ0σ̂η
)1/3√Σ0 + σ̂2η
Σ0
(1.41)
λ̂1 =
1− α
σu
(
1−α
Σ0σ̂η
)1/3(
σ̂η
(
1−α
Σ0σ̂η
)1/3
+ 1− α
)√ Σ0
Σ0 + σ̂
2
η
(1.42)
Substituting (1.34), (1.40), (1.41) and (1.42) into (1.30) results in the following
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equation for σ̂2η
α
√
g
g + 1
− (1− α)
(
g2/3 (1− α)−4/3 − 1
)√√√√ g2/31+g (1− α)2/3 + 1
g−1/3 (1− α)2/3 + 1
= 0 (1.43)
where σ̂2η = gΣ0
Expected profits in first period
E (pi1) = E
[(
v − P̂1
)
x̂1|v
]
= E
[(
v − P0 − λ̂1β̂1 (v̂′ − P0)
)
β̂1 (v̂
′ − P0)
]
=
β̂1(1−λ̂1β̂1)Σ0
1+g
Expected profits in second period with successful application
E
(
piN2
)
= E
[(
v − P̂N2
)
x̂N2 |v
]
= E
[
1
2
β̂
N
2
(
v − P̂1
)2]
=
β̂
N
2 Σ̂
N
1
2
Expected profits in second period with unsuccessful application
E
(
piD2
)
= E
[(
v − P̂D2
)
x̂D2 |v
]
= E
[
1
2
β̂
D
2 (v − v̂′)2
]
=
β̂
D
2 Σ̂
D
1
2
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1.7.3 Proof of Proposition 1.4
If the SEC constraints the manager’s second period trade, the manager’s total profits
is lower than those obtained from a trading strategy of disclosure as in Huddart et
al. (2001) if
E (pi1) + αE
(
piN2
)
+ (1− α)E (piD2 ) ≤σu√Σ02 (1.44)
From the plot of the expected profit function in Fig. 1.2, there is a threshold value
of α which we will call α∗, below which total expected profits from application are
lower than with disclosure. α∗ satisfies the equality
E (pi1) + αE
(
piN2
)
+ (1− α)E (piD2 ) =σu√Σ02 (1.45)
Substituting the profit functions in Proposition 1.1 into (1.45)
1− α√
1 + h
 2√h
h+ (1− α)2 +
α√
h+ (1− α)2
+
√
h
−√2=0 (1.46)
Notice that the exogenous parameters σu and Σ0 are not present in (1.46). From
(1.46) and (1.25), we obtain numerically to 3 decimal places:
α∗ ≈ 0.361
On the other hand, if the SEC does not restrict his second period trade, we find
that
E (pi1) + αE
(
piN2
)
+ (1− α)E (piD2 ) ≥σu√Σ02 (1.47)
This means the manager’s expected profits will always be higher than in the Huddart
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et al. (2001) case.
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Chapter 2
Strategic Trading and Disclosure of
Informed Traders in the Presence
of Copycats
2.1 Introduction
Many market participants face mandatory disclosure requirements under US securities
laws. They include corporate insiders and mutual fund managers. Corporate insiders
are required to disclose their equity trades as they have an unfair advantage over other
market participants. They have access to price sensitive information like new contract
wins and revenue projections. Therefore, their trades would be closely scrutinised by
the market when they are disclosed. On the other hand, the job of fund managers
is to gather information on the profit potential of the companies they cover so that
their portfolios can beat their respective benchmarks. The trades of well-known
investors like Warren Buffett and Bill Miller are on the radar screen of many market
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participants. Many investors try to free-ride on their expertise by replicating their
trades once they are disclosed. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven (2004) use
the term copycat funds to describe these investors. Warren Buffett is so well regarded
by the investment community that even the SEC acknowledged that there have been
a number of occasions where disclosure of Berkshire Hathaway’s (Warren Buffett’s
investment vehicle) stock purchase or selling programs resulted in temporary spikes
in the market1.
There are also other up-and-coming talented fund managers who receive less media
coverage than the Buffetts and Millers of this world. Even if they have superior
information, the disclosure of their trades would likely be followed by a smaller number
of copycats and thus have less market impact. We study the effect of trade disclosure
by an informed trader, using an exogenous variable to measure the number of copycats
that follow their trades. Previous theoretical papers on disclosure have used models
where the game is played between the insider or informed agent against the market-
maker. For example, Fishman (2006) assumes that any copycats or followers of the
informed investor’s trades would earn zero profits due to competition, and folds them
into market-makers in their model. In our model, we distinguish between the copycats
and the market-maker. Using a variation of Kyle (1985)’s model, we depart from
the literature by making the assumption that the copycats are able to identify the
disclosed trade of the informed trader, while the market-maker is only able to observe
the total order flow in each trading period. Although the market-maker knows that
the informed investor is trading, he cannot differentiate the latter from other noise
traders even after the trade is disclosed. As the number of copycats approaches
infinity, our model is equivalent to one where the market-maker is able to identify the
disclosed trade of the informed trader.
1See http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/2861039/Buffett-fails-in-bid-to-curb-copycats.html
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Similar to the model in Chapter 1, the model in this chapter is also closely related
to Huddart et al. (2001). The dissimulation result in Huddart et al. (2001) is also
present in this model, as the informed trader seeks to reduce the information that
the copycats receives and increase the information that is private to him so that
he can exploit it in the later trading period. An important finding in our paper is
that the total expected profits of the informed trader increases with the number of
copycats. As the number of copycats increases, the copycats trade more aggressively
on the information that the informed trader discloses in his initial trade. Ceteris
Paribus, the expected profits gained by the informed trader and each copycat on
this common information is reduced with the number of copycats. Therefore, in
equilibrium, the informed trader adds more noise in his initial trade, so that he has a
greater information advantage over the copycats in the second period. The increase
in second period expected profits outweighs the reduction in first period expected
profits with the increase in noise. It is widely accepted that the mandatory disclosure
requirements faced by fund managers would reduce their potential profits2. However,
given that there is at least one copycat tracking their trades, we show that they are
better off if there are more copycats following them.
Our model is also linked to the Kyle (1985) -type models with multiple informed
agents. Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992) extend Kyle’s model by increasing the
number of identically informed traders. The traders trade aggressively and cause
most of their private information to be revealed quickly as the number of informed
traders increase. The other models focus on strategic trading between asymmetrically
informed traders. Foster and Viswanathan (1994) use a model with two asymmetri-
cally informed traders. The better informed trader knows the information that the
less informed trader has. The latter learns from the former through the order flow
2See Wermers (2001) for a discussion on this subject.
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via transacted prices, while in our model the copycats learn through observing the
disclosed trade of the informed trader. Unlike Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992),
the better informed trader has an incentive to trade less intensively on his private
information in the earlier rounds of trading to reduce the amount of information the
less informed trader can learn. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) also study the strate-
gic trading between heterogeneously informed traders and they show that the degree
of competition depends on the correlation structure of the traders’ signals.
The paper most similar to ours is Zhang (2008). He extends the theoretical frame-
works of Foster and Viswanathan (1994) and Huddart et al. (2001) by analysing how
less informed outsiders learn from the disclosed trades of the informed trader3. The
key difference between our model and his is that the market-maker does not observe
the informed trader’s disclosed trades in our model. In his model, both the outsiders
and the market-maker update their information when the informed trader’s trades are
disclosed. As acknowledged by the author, a drawback of his model is that it requires
a sizeable number of outsiders. If the number of outsiders approaches zero, the model
does not result in meaningful numerical solutions and practical insights4. We do not
face this problem in our model as we have meaningful closed-form solutions for the
number of copycats ranging from one to infinity.
In our model, it is possible for the copycats to make abnormal profits due to
their skill of identifying the informed trader, as long as there are not an infinite
number of copycats. This is in line with previous empirical studies. There are several
studies that examine the returns of hypothetical copycat funds using data of U.S.
mutual funds. Frank et al. (2004) construct hypothetical copycat funds that mimic
3Zhang (2008) likens the outsiders to financial analysts gathering information about the particular
stock.
4Some parameters would have imaginary numbers if the number of outsiders is too small. Pa-
rameters like trading intensities and variances may also be negative.
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actively managed fund portfolios. They provide evidence that after expenses, copycat
funds earned statistically indistinguishable and possibly higher returns. They argue
that if investors buy actively managed funds to obtain high net-of-expenses returns,
then copycat funds could potentially erode their market share by offering comparable
returns net of expenses. Wang and Verbeek (2010) also provide evidence that copycat
are able to marginally outperform the funds they mimic, and this relative success
has increased after 2004, when all the funds are required to disclose on a quarterly
basis. There are also other papers that provide empirical evidence that strategies that
mimic the holdings of successful fund managers earn abnormal returns. Wermers, Yao
and Zhao (2007) aggregate portfolio holdings across mutual funds, weighted by their
past performance, to predict future stock returns. An overweighting by successful
managers or an underweighting by unsuccessful managers is considered to be a signal
that a stock is currently underpriced. Their investment strategies generate abnormal
returns exceeding 7% during the following year. Martin and Puthenpurackal (2008)
find that a hypothetical portfolio that mimics the investments of Warren Buffett’s
Berkshire Hathaway at the beginning of the following month after they are disclosed
also earns abnormal returns of 10.75% over the S&P500 index.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the set-up of
the model and equilibrium. Section 2.3 discusses comparative statics of equilibrium
and Section 2.4 concludes.
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2.2 Model
2.2.1 Set-up
The model set-up is similar to Chapter 1’s: two trading periods indexed by n ∈ {1, 2}
and one risky asset with a liquidation value of v, where v ∼ N (P0,Σ0). The liquidity
traders in this model can be interpreted as an infinite number of investment managers
who face mandatory disclosure requirements. They are required to disclose their first
period trade before trading in the second period commences. Among these investment
managers, only one knows the true value of v. This informed trader places a market
order to trade xn shares of the risky asset at period n. We assume that the rest of the
other investment managers are uninformed liquidity traders who summit in aggregate
exogenously generated orders un in each trading period, where un ∼ N (0, σ2u). u1, u2
and v are all mutually independent.
The key feature in this model is that we define copycats as agents who have
the special ability of identifying the informed trader amongst the infinite number of
uninformed liquidity traders. Let M be the number of identical copycats, indexed by
i = 1, 2, ...,M , where M is a positive integer. Based on the informed trader’s first
period trade x1, the M copycats each form the same expectation of v, and each trade
xC2 in the second period
5.
A competitive risk-neutral market-maker observes the aggregate order flow yn in
each period and sets the price to be equal to the posterior expectation of v. The price
is therefore semi-strong efficient and the market-maker makes expected zero profits
5In this model, the copycats are not exactly mimicking the trade of the informed trader. Rather,
they are trying to guess the true value of v based on the latter’s disclosed trade. It is possible for
the copycats to short the asset in the second period even though the informed trader bought in the
first period.
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due to Bertrand competition with potential rival market-makers. Unlike the copycats,
the market-maker is unable to distinguish the informed trader’s trade from the trades
of the other liquidity traders, although he knows that the informed trader is present.
Therefore there is no immediate adjustment in the price upon the disclosure of trades
in the first period, as in Huddart et al. (2001) and Zhang (2008). Figure 2.1 shows
the timeline of events.
Figure 2.1: Timeline of Events of Copycat Model
2.2.2 Equilibrium
Proposition 2.1 An invertible trading strategy of x1 = β1 (v − P0) does not consti-
tute a Nash equilibrium for all values of M
Proof: See Appendix 2.6.1
In Huddart et. al (2001), the authors show that an invertible trading strategy of
x1 = β1 (v − P0) does not constitute a Nash equilibrium. This is because the market-
maker would be able to infer v perfectly when x1 is disclosed and set λ2 = 0. The
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informed trader would be able to make infinite profits by deviating in his first period
trade. In our model, the market-maker does not observe x1, but the M copycats is
able to do so. If the trader trades x1 = β1 (v − P0) , he will lose his information
advantage to the copycats in the second period. To prove that an invertible trading
strategy of x1 = β1 (v − P0) does not constitute a Nash equilibrium for all values of M ,
we first consider an equilibrium where the informed trader trades x1 = β1 (v − P0),
and all M copycats and the informed trader are equally informed in the second
period. We then consider a scenario where the informed trader deviates by trading
x1 = (1 + µ) β1 (v − P0), keeping the other parameters constant. Fig 2.2 shows the
change in expected profits where µ = −2 (i.e. the trader makes an opposite trade:
x1 = −β1 (v − P0)). The change in expected profits are positive for all values of M
and increases with M . Therefore, similar to Huddart et al. (2001), an invertible
trading strategy of x1 = β1 (v − P0) also does not constitute a Nash equilibrium.
Figure 2.2: Increase in Total Expected Profits by Deviating in First Period: µ = −2
We show that an equilibrium exists where the informed trader’s first period trade
includes a random normal noise component z1, where z1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2z1
)
and it is in-
dependently distributed of v, u1 and u2. This implies that the M copycats would
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not be able to infer v perfectly. The informed trader thus maintains an informa-
tional advantage against the copycats even in the second period. Huddart et al.
(2001) term this strategy dissimulation. The informed insider’s first period trade is
x1 = β1 (v − P0) + z1. Having observed x1, the copycats’ expectation of v is
s1 = E (v|x1) = P0 + γ1x1 (2.1)
where
γ1 =
β1Σ0
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
(2.2)
Let us conjecture that the second period trades of the informed trader and the M
copycats are of the form
x2 = β2 (v − s1) + δ2 (s1 − P1) (2.3)
xC2 = δ
C
2 (s1 − P1) (2.4)
Following the notation used in Foster and Viswanathan (1994), we define the
following variables to measure the remaining information at the end of period 1 for
the M copycats and the market-maker. Firstly, Σ1 is the variance of the liquidation
value v, given the first period order flow y1. Secondly, Λ1 is the variance of the
liquidation value given the copycats’ signal x1. It measures the information advantage
of the informed trader over the copycats. Lastly, Ω1 is the variance of the copycats’
signal x1 given y1. It measures the information advantage of the copycats over the
market-maker.
Σ1 = var (v|y1) =
(
σ2z1 + σ
2
u
)
Σ0
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
+ σ2u
(2.5)
Λ1 = var (v|x1) =
σ2z1Σ0
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
(2.6)
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Ω1 = var (x1|y1) = Σ1 − Λ1 = β
2
1σ
2
uΣ
2
0(
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
+ σ2u
) (
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
) (2.7)
Proposition 2.2 A subgame perfect linear equilibrium exists in which
1. The market-maker’s pricing rule is of the linear form
Pn= Pn−1+λnyn, n ∈{1, 2}
2. The trading strategies and the expected profits of the informed trader and
the copycats are of the linear form
x1 = β1 (v − P0) + z1 x2 = β2 (v − s1) + δ2 (s1 − P1)
xC2 = δ
C
2 (s1 − P1)
λ1 = λ2 =
(
M+2
2
√
(M+1)2+(M+2)2
) √
Σ0
σu
β1 =
(
M+1√
(M+1)2+(M+2)2
)
σu√
Σ0
β2 =
1
2λ2
δ2 = δ
C
2 =
1
λ2(M+2)
γ1 = 2
(
M+1
M
)
λ1
σ2z1 =
Mσ2u
M+2
− β21Σ0
Σ1 =
[
1−
(
M+2
2(M+1)
)
β21Σ0
σ2u
]
Σ0 Λ1 =
[
1− (M+2
M
) β21Σ0
σ2u
]
Σ0
Ω1 =
(M+2)2
2M(M+1)
β21Σ
2
0
σ2u
E (pi1) = (1− λ1β1) β1Σ0 − λ1σ2z1 E (pi2) = 1λ2(M+2)2 Ω1 +
1
4λ2
Λ1
E
(
piC2
)
= 1
λ2(M+2)
2 Ω1
E (pi1) = E (pi2) +ME
(
piC2
)
Proof: See Appendix 2.6.2
β2 measures the informed trader’s trading aggressiveness on the information that
is still private to him in the second period. Conversely, δ2 measures the trading
aggressiveness on the information that is shared with the other M copycats and the
magnitude of this is equal to that of each copycat’s, i.e. δC2 .
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The expected profit of each copycat is a function of Ω1, since it measures the
variance of the copycats’ signal given the first period order flow. On the other hand,
the expected profit of the informed trader in his second period trade is a sum of two
components. The first component is equal to the expected profit of each copycat, since
the informed trader trades at the same intensity on the information that he shares
with the copycats. The second component is a function of Λ1, since it measures the
information of v not contained in x1. Similar to Huddart et al (2001), the market-
maker sets the price impact in the two trading periods to be equal, i.e. λ1 = λ2
6.
To sustain this equilibrium, the expected profit of the informed trader’s first period
trade must be equal to the sum of the expected profits of the informed trader and
copycats’ trades in the second period.
6The informed trader needs to be indifferent across all values of x1 for the mixed trading strategy
of the dissimulation component to hold in equilibrium.
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2.3 Comparative Statics
We next analyse the relationship between M and the parameters in Proposition 2.2.
Proposition 2.3 The following shows the relationship between M and the parameters
in Proposition 2.2
dβ1
dM
> 0 dβ2
dM
> 0
dδ2
dM
= dδ
C
2
dM
< 0
dλ1
dM
= dλ2
dM
< 0
dγ1
dM
< 0
dσ2z1
dM
> 0
dΣ1
dM
< 0 dΛ1
dM
> 0
dΩ1
dM
< 0
dE(pi1)
dM
< 0 dE(pi2)
dM
> 0
dE(piC2 )
dM
< 0
d(E(pi1)+E(pi2))
dM
> 0
d(E(pi1)+E(pi2)+ME(piC2 ))
dM
< 0
Proof: See Appendix 2.6.3
The informed trader increases β1, the trading aggressiveness on his information
as M increases. At the same time he also increases the variance of the dissimulation
term σ2z. Although the first action increases the informativeness of the copycats’
signal, the second action has an opposite effect, as Λ1 =
σ2zΣ0
β21Σ0+σ
2
z1
. The magnitude
of the second action is greater, since Λ1 increases with M . Therefore the informed
trader reveals less information about v in his first trade as M increases. In the second
period, as M increases, the informed trader increases β2, the trading aggressive on
the information that is still private to him. In addition, he also decreases δ2, the
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trading aggressiveness on the information he shares with the M copycats.
Figure 2.3: Relationship between Expected Profits of Informed Trader and M
Similar to Holden and Subrahmanyam (1992), the total expected profits of all the
informed agents (informed trader and M copycats) decrease as the number of copycats
M increases:
d(E(pi1)+E(pi2)+ME(piC2 ))
dM
< 0. As the number of copycats increases, the
copycats trade more aggressively on the information that the informed trader discloses
in his initial trade. Ceteris Paribus, the expected profits gained by the informed
trader and each copycat on this common information is reduced with the number
of copycats. Interestingly, although the total pie is shrinking, the expected profits
of the informed trader over the two trading periods increases with M (see Fig 2.3).
The expected profits in the first period decrease with M (see Fig 2.4) because the
informed trader increases σ2z1 (see Fig 2.5), the variance of the dissimulation in his
initial trade. However, in the second period, an increase in σ2z1 results in an increase
in the information that is private to the informed trader (higher Λ1) and reduces
the information he shares with the copycats (lower Ω1). This increases the expected
profits in the second period. The magnitude of this increase outweighs the reduction
in profits in the first period. All this means that although disclosure decreases the
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Figure 2.4: Relationship between Expected Profits of Informed Trader in each Period and
M
expected profits of the informed trader if he has at least 1 copycat tracking his trades,
he is better off having more rather than less copycats tracking his trades. In our two
period model, if there is no disclosure, the total expected profits is 0.8776 σu
√
Σ0
7.
If there is 1 copycat, under the dissimulation equilibrium, the total expected profits
fall to 0.6472σu
√
Σ0. As M approaches infinity, the total expected profits increase to
√
2
2
σu
√
Σ0 ≈ 0.7071σu
√
Σ0.
The total expected profits of all the copycats decrease as M increases since the
informed trader injects more noise in his initial trade (see Fig 2.6). The expected
profits of each copycat fall at a greater rate as there are now more of them sharing a
shrinking pie.
Another important point to note is that liquidity improves as M increases, since
dλ1
dM
= dλ2
dM
< 0. The improvement in liquidity is in line with the result that the
aggregate expected profits of the informed agents decrease as M increases. Noise
7We get this figure by setting M = 0. You can also use the parameters in Proposition 1 of Huddart
et al. (2001), but please note the typo: E (p¯i1) =
√
2K(2K−1)
4K−1 σu
√
Σ0 , not E (p¯i1) =
2K(2K−1)
(4K−1)2 σu
√
Σ0.
69
Figure 2.5: Relationship between σ2z1 and M
traders are therefore better off if there are more copycats.
Proposition 2.4 As M approaches infinity, the equilibrium is equivalent to one
where the market-maker is able to observe the informed trader’s disclosed trade.
Proof: See Appendix 2.6.4
As M approaches infinity, the parameters in Proposition 2.2 are similar to the
ones in Proposition 2 of Huddart et al. (2001)8. In their model, they assume that the
market-maker is able to observe the informed trader’s first period trade when it is
disclosed and there are no copycats. If there are an infinite number of copycats who
can identify the informed trader’s trade, it is intuitive that none of them can make
any abnormal profits. Therefore, they will not make any trade in the second period.
In addition, the informed trader’s second period trade is a function of v − E (v|x1),
since E (v|x1) is common knowledge to all market participants. Thus, the informed
trader’s trading intensity on E (v|x1) − P1 is zero, like all the other copycats. The
8In their paper, they define Σ1 = var (v|x1), while we define and Σ1 = var (v|y1) and Λ1 =
var (v|x1).
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Figure 2.6: Relationship between Expected Profits of Copycats and M
assumption of the market-maker being able to identify the disclosed trades of the
informed trader is therefore a special case in our model.
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2.4 Conclusion
Besides corporate insiders, our model is applicable to other informed traders who face
mandatory disclosure requirements, e.g. mutual funds and other investment holding
companies. The trades of famous investors like Warren Buffet and Bill Miller are
closely scrutinised by the market, but there are also other up-and-coming talented
fund managers who may have less market coverage. Therefore, even if they know the
true value of the asset, informed traders with different media exposure do not have the
same market impact when they disclose their trades. We propose to use parameter
M in our model as a measure of the number of copycats that track the trades of
the informed trader. We show that the optimum strategy of the informed trader is
to add a dissimulation term to his initial trade to reduce the amount of information
available to the copycats. This will increase the information that is private to him so
that he can exploit it in the later trading period. In addition, we also show that it
is possible for the copycats to earn abnormal profits as they have a special ability to
identify the disclosed trades of the informed trader, compared to the market-maker.
As the number of copycats approaches infinity, the profits of each copycat fall to zero
and the equilibrium is equivalent to one where the market-maker is able to identify
the disclosed trades of the informed trader (as in Huddart et al. (2001)).
An important finding in our paper is that the total expected profits of the in-
formed trader increases with the number of copycats. It is widely accepted that the
mandatory disclosure requirements faced by fund managers would reduce their po-
tential profits. However, given that there is at least one copycat tracking their trades,
we show that they are better off if there are more copycats following them. This has
several implications. Besides raising new fund flows, an extra benefit of the marketing
activities of fund managers is to increase media coverage. This might result in more
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copycats studying their trades. Top fund managers with a greater number of copycats
are also better placed to sustain their performance against other good managers with
a smaller following. Lastly, it pays for copycats to expend effort to find the next
Warren Buffett and study his trades.
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Proof of Proposition 2.1
Suppose the informed trader does not dissimulate his initial signal and trades x1 =
β1 (v − P0). Having observed x1, the M copycats are able to abstract v perfectly. The
informed trader and the M copycats would thus share the same information in the
second trading period. All M+1 agents would make the same trade x2 = β2 (v − P1).
We proceed by backward induction. The informed trader’s objective function in
the second period is
max
x2
E (pi2|P1, v) = max
x2
E
((
v − P1 − λ2
(
x2 +Mx
C
2
))
x2
)
Taking first order condition with respect to x2, and then setting x2 = x
C
2
x2 =
v − P1
λ2 (M + 2)
β2 =
1
λ2 (M + 2)
(2.8)
The informed trader’s objective function in the first period is
max
x1
E (pi1|v) + E (pi2|P1, v)
= max
x1
E
((
v − P0 − λ1x1
)
x1
)
+
1
λ2 (M + 2)
2E
((
v − P0 − λ1x1
)2)
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Taking first order condition with respect to x1
x1 =
λ2 (M + 2)
2 − 2λ1
2λ1
(
λ2 (M + 2)
2 − λ1
) (v − P0)
β1 =
λ2 (M + 2)
2 − 2λ1
2λ1
(
λ2 (M + 2)
2 − λ1
) (2.9)
Using the projection theorem of normal random variables, we obtain
Σ1 =
(
1− β1λ1
)
Σ0 (2.10)
Σ2 =
Σ1
M + 2
(2.11)
λ1 =
β1Σ1
σ2u
(2.12)
λ2 =
(M + 1) β2Σ2
σ2u
(2.13)
Following Huddart et al. (2001), (2.8), (2.11), (2.12) and (2.13) gives β1 =
M+1
(M+2)2
λ1
λ
2
2
. Equating the right-hand sides of this and (2.9) results in a cubic poly-
nomial in terms of K = λ2
λ1
(M + 2)4K3 − 2 (M + 2)2K2 − 2 (M + 1) (M + 2)2K + 2 (M + 1) = 0 (2.14)
Lets us suppose that the informed trader deviates by trading x1 = (1 + µ) β1 (v − P0).
When x1 is disclosed, the M copycats’ signal of v is (1 + µ) (v − P0) +P0. In the sec-
ond period, the M copycats trade xC2 = β2 ((1 + µ) (v − P0) + P0 − P1).
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The informed trader’s objective function in the second period is
max
x2
E (pi2|P1, v) = max
x2
E
((
v − P1 − λ2
(
x2 +Mx
C
2
))
x2
)
Taking first order condition with respect to x2
x2 =
v − P1
2λ2
− Mx
C
2
2
The informed trader’s total expected profits by deviating is
E (pi1|v) + E (pi2|P1, v)
= E
((
v − P0 − λ1x1
)
x1
)
+
1
λ2 (M + 2)
2E
(((
1− Mµ
2
)
(v − P0)− λ1x1
)2)
The change in total expected profits by deviating is
∆E (pi) =
 −µβ1 (2β1λ1 + µβ1λ1 − 1)
+ 1
4λ2(M+2)
2µ
(
M + 2β1λ1
) (
4β1λ1 +Mµ+ 2µβ1λ1 − 4
)
Σ0
Suppose µ = −2. This means that the informed trader makes an opposite trade
of equal magnitude in the first period
∆E (pi) =
[
M + 2β1λ1
λ2 (M + 2)
− 2β1
]
Σ0
From the plot in Fig 2.1, it can be seen that the change in total expected profits
by deviating in first period is positive for all values of M .
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2.6.2 Proof of Proposition 2.2
Applying backward induction, we solve for the informed trader’s and the copycats’
optimisation problems in the second period. The informed trader’s objective function
in the second period is
max
x2
E (pi2|P1, v) = max
x2
E
((
v − P1 − λ2
(
x2 +Mx
C
2
))
x2
)
Taking first order condition with respect to x2,
x2 =
v − P1
2λ2
− Mx
C
2
2
(2.15)
On the other hand, the objective function of each copycat in the second period
is
max
xC2
E
(
piC2 |P1, x1
)
= max
xC2
E
((
s1 − P1 − λ2
(
δ2 (s1 − P1) + xˆC2 + (M − 1) xˆC2
))
xC2
)
where xˆC2 is the optimal trade of the other M − 1 copycats.
Taking first order condition with respect to xC2 and equating x
C
2 = xˆ
C
2
xC2 =
1− λ2δ2
λ2 (M + 1)
(s1 − P1) (2.16)
Substituting (2.16) into (2.15) yields
x2 =
v − s1
2λ2
+
(
1
2λ2
− M
2
(
1− λ2δ2
λ2 (M + 1)
))
(s1 − P1) (2.17)
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Comparing (2.17) with (2.3) implies
β2 =
1
2λ2
(2.18)
δ2 = δ
C
2 =
1
λ2 (M + 2)
(2.19)
Since y1 = β1 (v − P0) + z1 + u1 and y2 = β2 (v − s1) + (M + 1) δ2 (s1 − P1) + u2,
using the projection theorem of normal random variables we obtain
λ1 =
β1Σ0
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
+ σ2u
(2.20)
λ2 =
β2Λ1 + (M + 1) δ2Ω1
β22Λ1 + (M + 1)
2 δ22Ω1 + σ
2
u
(2.21)
The informed trader’s objective function in the first period is
max
x1
E (pi1|v) + E (pi2|v)
= max
x1
E ((v − P0 − λ1 (x1 + u1))x1|v) + 14λ2 (v − P0 − γ1x1)
2 + 1
(M+2)2λ2
((γ1 − λ1)x1)2
+ 1
(M+2)λ2
(v − P0 − γ1x1) ((γ1 − λ1)x1)
Taking first order condition with respect to x1,
(v − P0)
(
1− γ1
2λ2
+
(γ1 − λ1)
(M + 2)λ2
)
+x1
(
−2λ1 + γ
2
1
2λ2
+
2 (γ1 − λ1)2
(M + 2)2 λ2
− 2γ1 (γ1 − λ1)
(M + 2)λ2
)
= 0
The second order condition is
−2λ1 + γ
2
1
2λ2
+
2 (γ1 − λ1)2
(M + 2)2 λ2
− 2γ1 (γ1 − λ1)
(M + 2)λ2
≤ 0
For the mixed strategy x1 = β1 (v − P0)+z1, z ∼ N
(
0, σ2z1
)
to hold in equilibrium,
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the informed trader must be indifferent across all values of x1. Therefore
1− γ1
2λ2
+
(γ1 − λ1)
(M + 2)λ2
= 0 (2.22)
and
−2λ1 + γ
2
1
2λ2
+
2 (γ1 − λ1)2
(M + 2)2 λ2
− 2γ1 (γ1 − λ1)
(M + 2)λ2
= 0 (2.23)
(2.22) and (2.23) imply that
λ1 = λ2 (2.24)
γ1 = 2
(
M + 1
M
)
λ1 (2.25)
(2.25) and (2.20) yields
γ1 = 2
(
M + 1
M
)
β1Σ0
β21Σ0 + σ
2
z1
+ σ2u
(2.26)
Comparing (2.26) with (2.2) implies
σ2z1 =
Mσ2u
M + 2
− β21Σ0 (2.27)
Given (2.6), (2.7) and (2.21) we have
λ2 =
√(
1− β21Σ0
σ2u
)
Σ0
2σu
(2.28)
Given (2.2) and (2.25) we have
λ1 =
M + 2
2 (M + 1)
β1Σ0
σ2u
(2.29)
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Since λ1 = λ2, √(
1− β21Σ0
σ2u
)
Σ0
2σu
=
M + 2
2 (M + 1)
β1Σ0
σ2u
β1 =
 M + 1√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
 σu√
Σ0
(2.30)
Expected profits of the informed trader in the first period
E (pi1) = E ((v − P0 − λ1 (β1 (v − P0) + z1 + u1)) (β1 (v − P0) + z1) |v)
E (pi1) = (1− λ1β1) β1Σ0 − λ1σ2z1 (2.31)
Expected profits of the informed trader in the second period
E (pi2) = E
((
v − P1 − λ2
(
x2 +Mx
C
2 + u2
))
x2|v
)
= E
((
v−s1
2
+ 1
M+2
(s1 − P1)
)
(β2 (v − s1) + δ2 (s1 − P1)) |v
)
= E
(
β2
2
Λ1 +
δ2
M+2
Ω1 +
(
δ2
2
+ β2
M+2
)
(v − s1) (s1 − P1) |v
)
Since E ((v − s1) (s1 − P1) |v) = 0
E (pi2) =
1
4λ2
Λ1 +
1
λ2 (M + 2)
2 Ω1 (2.32)
Expected profits of each copycat in the second period
E
(
piC2
)
= E
(
(v − P2)xC2 |x1
)
= E
(
(s1 − P1 − λ2 (β2 − δ2) (s1 − P1)) δC2 (s1 − P1)
)
= (1− λ2 (β2 − δ2)) δC2 Ω1
E
(
piC2
)
=
1
λ2 (M + 2)
2 Ω1 (2.33)
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With (2.30), we can solve the rest of the parameters in Proposition 2.2.
2.6.3 Proof of Proposition 2.3
Let us express the parameters in Proposition 2.2 in terms of the exogenous variables
M , Σ0 and σu.
λ1 = λ2 =
 M + 2
2
√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
 √Σ0
σu
(2.34)
β2 =

√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
M + 2
 σu√
Σ0
(2.35)
γ1 =
 (M + 1) (M + 2)
M
√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
 √Σ0
σu
(2.36)
δ2 = δ
C
2 =
2
√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
(M + 2)2
 σu√
Σ0
(2.37)
σ2z1 =
(
M
M + 2
− (M + 1)
2
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
)
σ2u (2.38)
Σ1 =
(
1− (M + 1) (M + 2)
2
(
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
))Σ0 (2.39)
Λ1 =
(
1− (M + 1)
2 (M + 2)
M
(
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
))Σ0 (2.40)
Ω1 =
(M + 1) (M + 2)2
2M
(
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
)Σ0 (2.41)
E (pi1) =
 M + 2
2
√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
σu√Σ0 (2.42)
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E (pi2) =
 M2 + 2M + 2
2 (M + 2)
√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
σu√Σ0 (2.43)
E
(
piC2
)
=
 M + 1
M (M + 2)
√
(M + 1)2 + (M + 2)2
σu√Σ0 (2.44)
With the above equations, we can obtain the derivatives with respect to M in Propo-
sition 2.3.
2.6.4 Proof of Proposition 2.4
Using the equations in Appendix 2.6.3, we derive the limits of the parameters as M
approaches infinity
lim
M→∞
β1 =
√
2
2
σu√
Σ0
(2.45)
lim
M→∞
β2 =
√
2
σu√
Σ0
(2.46)
lim
M→∞
δ2 = lim
M→∞
δC2 = 0 (2.47)
lim
M→∞
λ1 = lim
M→∞
λ2 =
√
2
4
√
Σ0
σu
(2.48)
lim
M→∞
γ1 =
√
2
2
√
Σ0
σu
(2.49)
lim
M→∞
σ2z1 =
σ2u
2
(2.50)
lim
M→∞
Σ1 =
3
4
Σ0 (2.51)
lim
M→∞
Λ1 =
Σ0
2
(2.52)
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lim
M→∞
Ω1 =
Σ0
4
(2.53)
lim
M→∞
E (pi1) =
√
2
4
σu
√
Σ0 (2.54)
lim
M→∞
E (pi2) =
√
2
4
σu
√
Σ0 (2.55)
lim
M→∞
E
(
piC2
)
= 0 (2.56)
lim
M→∞
(E (pi1) + E (pi2)) =
√
2
2
σu
√
Σ0 (2.57)
lim
M→∞
(
E (pi1) + E (pi2) +ME
(
piC2
))
=
√
2
2
σu
√
Σ0 (2.58)
It follows that the limits of the parameters as M approaches infinity are similar
to those of a two-period Huddart et al. (2001) model.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of More Frequent
Portfolio Disclosure on Mutual
Fund Performance
3.1 Introduction
In 2004 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) amended the Investment
Company Act of 1940 and required mutual funds to file its complete portfolio holdings
schedule with the Commission on a quarterly basis 1. There were several arguments
in support of the increase in the disclosure frequency. First, more frequent disclo-
sure would allow shareholders to observe the securities held by various funds more
accurately. This in turn would help them with the asset allocation and diversifica-
tion choice of their overall portfolios. Second, shareholders would be able to better
monitor whether, and how, a fund is complying with its stated investment objective.
1within 60 days of the end of the fiscal quarter.
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Third, quarterly disclosure would make it easier to track whether funds are engaging
in various forms of portfolio manipulation such as window dressing.2
With the increase in the disclosure frequency, it was feared that funds would be
forced to incur higher cost. Apart from the increase in direct expenses associated
with producing and distributing holding related information, there would be costs
coming from higher exposure to activities such as front running and free riding.
Front running refers to the scenario where other traders buy (sell) securities in
anticipation of buy (sell) trades by the fund. The fund may therefore be forced to
trade at unfavorable prices. Periodic releases of fund holdings data, together with
daily releases of the funds net asset values (NAV) and returns, allow other market
participants to anticipate the funds trades in real time using computer programs that
specialize in estimating portfolio changes. Increasing the frequency of disclosure will
improve the precision of such front running models, yielding higher returns at the
cost of the mutual funds.
There are previous empirical studies that provide evidence on the front-running
activities in the market. Cai (2003) uses a unique data set to examine the behavior of
the market makers in the Treasury bond futures market when LTCM faced difficulties
in 1998. He finds that market makers engaged in front running against customer
orders coming from a particular clearing firm- orders that closely matched various
features of LTCMs trades through Bear Stearns. Coval and Stafford (2007) show
that mutual funds that experience large outflows (inflows), tend to decrease (increase)
existing positions. This creates opportunities for outsiders to front run the anticipated
forced trades by mutual funds experiencing extreme fund flows. Their hypothetical
front running strategy earns between 0.35% to 1.07% a month. Chen, Hanson, Hong
2See 17 CFR Parts 210, 239, et al. Shareholder Reports and Quarterly Portfolio Disclosure of
Registered Management Investment Companies; Final Rule, March 9 2004
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and Stein (2008) find indirect evidence that hedge funds do pursue front running
strategies of the kind mentioned in Coval and Stafford (2007) and profit during periods
of mutual fund distress.
Free riding refers to the situation where some funds mimic the holdings of an
actively managed fund. They rebalance their holdings based on periodic portfolio
disclosure of the actively managed funds. Frank, Poterba, Shackelford and Shoven
(2004) use mutual fund holdings data and construct hypothetical copycat funds that
mimic actively managed fund portfolios. They provide evidence that after expenses,
copycat funds earn statistically indistinguishable and possibly higher returns. They
argue that copycat funds could potentially erode the market share of actively managed
funds (with high expense ratios) by offering comparable returns net of expenses. In a
bigger sample Wang and Verbeek (2010) find that copycat funds on average marginally
outperform their actively managed counterparts net of trading costs and expenses.
The average relative performance of the copycat funds increases significantly (by 5
basis points a month) after the increase in disclosure frequency in 2004.
Copycats may adversely affect fund performance if they can cause the price to
move before the fund could fully benefit from its research/ investment strategy. Some
argue that most positions could be bought or sold in a short span of time without
incurring much trading cost. However, others do not agree and argue that more
frequent disclosure might expose funds to substantial market impact costs. 3
There is also an indirect channel in which free riding activities can reduce the fund
returns. If copycat funds can generate comparable net returns (they have zero research
expenses) as the original actively managed funds, they will attract new investments.
The resulting competition will lead to lower or slowly increasing assets for the original
3For example see Craig S. Tyle, Comment Letter Re: Shareholder Reports and Quarterly portfolio
Disclosure of Regulated Investment Companies (Investment Company Inst, 2003)
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active funds. This implies that the existing shareholders of the active funds will have
to bear a larger chunk of the research related expenses.
However, in some situations fund returns may be enhanced by copycat activities
if their trades increase the price of the stocks held by the original active funds. In
those cases portfolio disclosure in fact enables the fund managers to realize favorable
return on their security positions in a shorter time frame.
In this paper we study the impact of more frequent portfolio disclosure on mutual
fund performance.
We compare the performance of the semi-annual funds with that of the quarterly
funds between 1990 and 2003 and between 2005 and 2008. If a fund discloses less often,
it is likely that it will be less exposed to activities such as front running. However,
fund shareholders may incur higher agency costs as they won’t be able to monitor
fund activities more frequently. To identify the impact of lower disclosure frequency
on performance, we focus on the successful (skilled funds). It is more probable that
in successful funds, agency effects will not outweigh the benefits from lower exposure
to activities such as front running. Thus our hypothesis is - successful semi-annual
funds will be less exposed to activities such as front running compared to successful
quarterly funds and hence will perform better. The same may not be true for the
poorly performing semi-annual funds. Less monitoring by the investors owing to less
frequent disclosure might lead the managers in poorly managed funds to indulge in
value destroying activities and this agency cost might outweigh some or all of the
benefits accrued from less exposure to activities such as front running activities.
Between 1990 and 2003 we find that the successful semi-annual funds outperform
the successful quarterly funds by 17 to 20 basis points a month. Then we compare
the performance of the successful semi-qtly funds (funds that were semi-annual before
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and have become quarterly after 2004) and the successful qtly- qtly (funds that were
quarterly even before 2004) funds between 2005 and 2008. Unlike before 2004, we
do not find any significant difference in their performance. We do a difference-in-
difference test with semi-annual funds which were forced to disclose quarterly after
2004 as the treatment group and funds which have been quarterly throughout as
the control group. We find that the performance of successful previously semiannual
funds have come down by about 22 basis point a month after 2004. That is the
performance of the previously semi-annual successful funds has come down after 2004
to the extent that they are no longer different from the quarterly successful funds after
2004. This suggests that the previously semi-annual funds are now more exposed to
activities such as front running and this is affecting their performance adversely.
Then we turn our attention to the illiquid and liquid funds (funds who invests
in illiquid and liquid assets respectively). Trades by illiquid funds will incur larger
price impacts and will attract more front runners. It is likely that illiquid funds will
benefit more by disclosing less frequently compared to other funds and particularly
compared to liquid funds.
Between 1990 and 2003 we find that successful illiquid semi-annual funds outper-
form the successful quarterly funds by 32 basis points a month. At the same time
we don’t find any significant difference between the performance of successful liquid
semi-annual and quarterly funds. In a difference in difference test we find that the
performance of successful previously semiannual illiquid funds have come down by
about 34 basis points a month after 2004. We do not see any such reduction in per-
formance for the liquid semiannual funds. We repeat this exercise for the small cap
and large cap funds. By their investment styles, small cap funds invest in small cap
stocks which are relatively illiquid and large cap funds in large cap stocks which are
relatively liquid. We find similar results as in our earlier illiquid and liquid fund tests.
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We then look at the total assets under management of the funds. Semi-annual
funds seem to be bigger in size compared to quarterly funds. Ge and Zheng (2006)
find that large funds are more likely to disclose less frequently. Funds with large assets
under management are more likely to trade in bigger sizes with larger price impact.
This will attract more front-runners. Hence if these large funds disclose less often
they will save more on trading costs. We find that the outperformance of successful
semi-annual funds over the successful quarterly funds increases with the size of the
funds. We don’t find any such relationship after 2004.
Between 1990 and 2003 we do not find any significant difference between the
performance of poorly performing semi-annual and quarterly funds. It appears that
any gain on less front running for the semi-annual fund is negated by larger agency cost
incurred by the fund managers as a result of less monitoring. The increase of disclosure
frequency after 2004 was expected to reduce the agency cost in the previously semi-
annual poorly performing funds and hence to improve their performance after 2004.
However this would also expose the funds to activities such as front-running and it
was not obvious which effect would dominate. We compare the performance of poorly
performing semi-qtly funds and poorly performing qtly- qtly funds between 2005 and
2008. We do not find any significant difference in their performance (as was the case
prior to 2004). This suggests that any improvement in the agency cost of the poorly
performing previously semi-annual funds after 2004 has been negated by the increase
in the trading costs owing to activities such as front running.
As a robustness check we examine the impact of disclosure frequency on the un-
observed action of the mutual funds captured by return gap (the difference between
the reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously
disclosed fund holdings).
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During 1990-2003 period, we find that the return gap of the successful semi annual
funds to be higher than that of successful quarterly funds by about 12 basis points
a month. This difference in return gap between semi-annual successful and quarterly
successful funds persists over time and predicts the difference in their future per-
formance. This implies that unobserved actions of the successful semi-annual funds
create more value compared to their quarterly counterparts. However, after 2004 we
do not see any such difference in return gap between previously semi-annual funds
and funds that have been quarterly throughout.
Our paper is related to Ge and Zheng (2006). Using data between 1985 and
1999, they find that past winners (losers) who disclose less frequently outperform
(underperform) past winners (losers) who disclose more frequently. We take the
change in mandatory disclosure policy as an exogenous event to examine the impact
of disclosure frequency on the performance of mutual funds. Ours is a cleaner test
because prior to 2004 the funds could choose between quarterly and semi-annual
frequency (for that matter any frequency higher than semi-annual).
Rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the hypotheses,
Section 3.3 discusses the methodology, Section 3.4 describes the data , Section 3.5
presents the results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Hypotheses
We would like to test the impact of frequency of mandatory disclosure on mutual fund
performance. We conjecture that if a fund discloses less often, it will be less exposed
to activities such as front running. This will lead to superior performance compared to
a fund which discloses more often. On the other hand there are concerns that agency
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costs may go up in the funds with less frequent disclosure as fund shareholders will
not be able to monitor fund activities more frequently.
The net result of these two opposing effects - lower trading cost (owing to less front
running) and higher agency cost (owing to less monitoring) is not obvious in funds
which discloses less often. Hence to examine the effects of lower disclosure frequency
on performance, we focus on the successful ( skilled funds). It is more likely that
in successful funds, agency effects will not outweigh the benefits from lower trading
cost. Thus we should expect successful semi-annual finds to outperform successful
quarterly funds.
Prior to 2004 (1985-2004), mandatory frequency of disclosure was semi-annual.
However some 60% of the funds opted to disclose quarterly. So one could possibly
compare the performance of the successful semi-annual and quarterly funds during
this period to examine the effects of disclosure frequency on fund performance. How-
ever, this test will not give us the correct picture as disclosure frequency is not deter-
mined exogenously.4 Still we should expect a statistical association between the two,
particularly if there is a cost to switch from one disclosure frequency to the other.
We look at the performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds before 2004, how-
ever, we address the problem arising from endogenous choice of disclosure frequency
by using the change in mandatory disclosure frequency in 2004 as a natural exper-
iment. After 2004, all the funds have to disclose their holdings every quarter. We
consider the funds which disclosed semi-annually before 2004 as our treatment group
and the funds which disclosed quarterly even before 2004 as our control group and
test the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The change in mandatory disclosure frequency in 2004 will have
4Funds could choose any frequency higher than semi-annual during this period.
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a detrimental effect on the performance of successful previously semi-annual funds
compared to successful funds which have been quarterly throughout.
Free riding and front running could be two channels by which portfolio disclosure
can affect the fund performance. Free riding will be costly for the funds if it can
cause the price to move before the fund could fully benefit from its research and
investment strategies. There is also an indirect channel through which free riding
activities can reduce the net fund returns. There is evidence that copycat funds can
generate comparable net returns as the original active funds. This implies that both
the original active and copycat funds will compete for investments in the market.
This will lead to lower assets for the active funds or slower growth of their assets and
its existing shareholders will have to bear a larger part of the research expenses. Also,
as we have discussed already, there are scenarios where original active fund returns
may be enhanced by free riding activities. Thus the impact of free riding activities
on the fund returns is not obvious.
However front running activities are always costly for the funds and it will be
severe for funds holding illiquid assets. Trades by illiquid funds will incur larger price
impact and will appear as lucrative profit making opportunities to the front runners.
By the same logic, funds holding relatively liquid assets will attract less front runners
and its performance will suffer less from these activities. We formulate the following
hypothesis to test this.
Hypothesis 2: The effect predicted in Hypothesis 1 will be stronger for semi-annual
funds holding illiquid assets than those holding liquid assets.
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3.3 The Difference-in-Difference test
A clean way to examine the impact of change in the disclosure frequency on mutual
fund performance will be to implement a difference-in-difference test. This is possible
because in the sample we have funds who disclosed semi-annually before 2004 and
were subsequently forced to change to quarterly disclosure frequency after 2004 . This
group of funds (semi-qtly funds)will be our treatment group. There are also funds
who had been voluntarily disclosing quarterly before 2004. So the change in the policy
will not affect the performance of this group of funds (qtly-qtly). We treat them as
our control group.
As discussed before, to identify the effect of change of disclosure frequency better,
we focus on the successful semi-annual and quarterly funds only. That is, we restrict
our sample to the top ranking funds based on their past 12-month four factor abnormal
return. Our econometric specification is the following.
Alphai,t = Constant+ β1 ∗Semii + β2 ∗POST2004 + β3 ∗Semii ∗POST2004 +
β4 ∗Xi,t + i,t
Where Alphai,t is fund i’s four factor abnormal return in month t . Semii is
an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990
and 2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a
value of one if t is later than 2004. Xi,t is a set of control variables such as Total
net asset, Expense ratio etc. All the control variables are lagged by a month. We
include year dummies in the regression and use panel corrected standard errors. Here
the coefficient of interest is β3, which captures the impact of change in disclosure
frequency on the performance of successful previously semi-annual funds. We expect
it to be negative.
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We repeat the above test by restricting our sample to poorly performing funds
(bottom ranking funds, based on their past 12-month four factor abnormal return)
only. In this case β3 will capture the impact of change in disclosure frequency on the
performance of poorly performing previously semi-annual funds.
If we do not restrict our sample to successful or poorly performing funds only,
the econometric specification corresponds to that of a Difference-in-Difference-in-
Difference (triple difference) test as specified below.
Alphai,t = Constant + β1 ∗ Semii + β2 ∗ POST2004 + β3 ∗ Rank4i,t−1 + γ1 ∗
Rank4i,t−1 ∗ Semii + γ2 ∗ Rank4i,t−1 ∗ POST2004 + γ3 ∗ Semii ∗ POST2004 + δ1 ∗
Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗Rank4i,t−1 + δ2 ∗Xi,t + i,t
Where the new independent variable Rank4i,t−1 is an indicator variable and takes
a value of one if fund i belongs to the top quintile based on the past 12 months four
factor abnormal return. Otherwise, it takes a value of zero. Here the coefficient of
interest is δ1 which is equivalent to β3 in the previous equation and captures the same
effect (the impact of change in disclosure frequency on the performance of successful
previously semi-annual funds). As before we expect it to be negative.
Also we test the impact of change in disclosure frequency on the performance of
poorly performing previously semi-annual funds by the following specification.
Alphai,t = Constant + β1 ∗ Semii + β2 ∗ POST2004 + β3 ∗ Rank0i,t−1 + γ1 ∗
Rank0i,t−1 ∗ Semii + γ2 ∗ Rank0i,t−1 ∗ POST2004 + γ3 ∗ Semii ∗ POST2004 + δ1 ∗
Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗Rank0i,t−1 + δ2 ∗Xi,t + i,t
Here the new independent variable Rank0i,t−1 is an indicator variable and takes
a value of one if fund i belongs to the bottom quintile based on the past 12 months
four factor abnormal return. Otherwise it takes a value of zero. Here the coefficient
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of interest is again δ1.
3.4 Data and Summary Statistics
Our sample covers the time period between 1990 and 2009. The mandatory portfolio
disclosure frequency for the mutual funds was semi annual until 2004. So we divide
our sample into two - 1990 and 2003 and 2005-2008. We follow Kacperczyk , Sialm and
Zheng (2007) and merge the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Survivor-
ship Bias Free Mutual Fund Database with the Thompson Financial CDA/Spectrum
holdings database and the CRSP stock price data. The CRSP mutual fund database
includes information on fund returns, total net assets (TNA), different types of fees,
investment objectives, and other fund characteristics. The CDA/Spectrum database
provides stock holdings of mutual funds. The data are collected both from reports
filed by mutual funds with the SEC and from voluntary reports generated by the
funds.
We focus on open-end US domestic equity mutual funds. We eliminate balanced,
bond, money market, international, and sector funds, as well as funds not invested
primarily in equity securities. To be more precise we base our selection criteria on
the objective codes and on the disclosed asset compositions. We select funds with
the following ICDI objectives: AG, GI, LG, or IN. If a fund does not have any of the
above ICDI objectives, we select funds with the following Strategic Insight objectives:
AGG, GMC, GRI, GRO, ING, or SCG. If a fund has neither the Strategic Insight
nor the ICDI objective, then we go to the Wiesenberger Fund Type Code and pick
funds with the following objectives: G, G-I, AGG, GCI, GRI, GRO, LTG, MCG, and
SCG. If none of these objectives is available and the fund has a CS policy (Common
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Stocks are the securities mainly held by the fund), then the fund is included.
We exclude funds that have the following Investment Objective Codes in the Spec-
trum Database: International, Municipal Bonds, Bond and Preferred, and Balanced.
The reported objectives do not always indicate whether a fund portfolio is balanced
or not, and hence we exclude funds that, on average, hold less than 80% or more
than 105% in stocks. We also exclude funds that hold fewer than 10 stocks and those
which in the previous month managed less than $5 million.
If a fund has multiple share classes, we eliminate the duplicate funds and compute
the fund-level variables by aggregating across the different share classes - for the TNA
under management, we sum the TNAs of the different share classes. For the other
quantitative attributes of funds (e.g., returns, expenses etc), we take the weighted
average of the attributes of the individual share classes, where the weights are the
lagged TNAs of the individual share classes.
To identify illiquid and liquid funds, we adopt the following two approaches. First,
we retrieve from the Thompson database the detailed holding data for each fund in
the sample and obtain the Gibb’s estimate5 for each of the stocks held by funds.6
The liquidity measure of the fund is then calculated as the value weighted average
liquidity measure of the funds’ underlying securities. Every month we divide the
funds into tertiles based on their liquidity measure and call the top tertile funds as
5We download the estimates from Joel Hasbrouck’s website at http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/ jhas-
brou/. The Gibbs estimator is a Bayesian version of Rolls (1984) transactions cost measure
c =
{ √−cov(rt, rt−1) if cov(rt, rt−1) < 0
0 otherwise
This measure derives from a model in which rt = c ∗ δq + ut where qt is a trade direction indicator
(buyer or seller initiated), c the parameter to be estimated, δqt the change in the indicator from
period t− 1 to t, and ut an error term. A couple of algebraic steps leads to the previous expression
under the assumption that buyer and seller initiated trades are equally likely.
6We also use the Amihud liquidity measure instead of Gibbs estimate and find similar results
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illiquid funds and the bottom tertile funds as liquid funds.
Second, we identify the small cap and large cap funds from the sample by Strategic
Insight objective code and Lipper class code from the CRSP Mutual Fund Data
Base. We also check the names of the funds and Morningstar investment style data
to confirm their investment styles. We find 77 semi-annual and 215 quarterly small
cap funds. Similarly we find 87 semi-annual and 206 quarterly large cap funds. We
consider funds which invest in small cap stocks as illiquid funds and which invest in
large cap stocks as liquid funds.
3.4.1 Summary Statistics
Table 3.1 reports summary statistics of the main fund attributes.There are 2901
unique funds in our sample. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses
every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its whole
life span. Changing this threshold to say 70% or 80% does not qualitatively change
our results. So for most part of the analysis we stick to the 75% threshold.7 At this
level we have around 1200 quarterly funds and 600 semi-annual funds in Thompson
Financial CDA/Spectrum database. However after merging with CRSP database and
screening the sample following the procedure mentioned above, we have 777 quarterly
and 392 semi-annual domestic equity funds. This number goes up when we define
semi-annual and quarterly funds at a lower threshold - say at 70%.
Panel A of this table displays the mean, the median, the standard deviation,
the 25th and the 75th percentile of the TNA (Total Net Assets), number of stock
7Owing to missing data and other reasons such as change in the fiscal year, we do not see a fund
disclosing at the same frequency throughout its existence. So we allow for some of the disclosures to
be at different frequencies and still call a fund semi-annual / quarterly as the case may be. When
we increase the threshold beyond 80% we have fewer funds and our statistical tests lack power.
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holdings, expense ratio, new money flow, annual turnover and age of all the funds
in the sample. Panel B, reports the same details for the the quarterly funds and
Panel C for the the semi-annual funds. We calculate new money flow as follows:
flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
.
Table 3.2 compares the characteristics of all the funds in the sample with that
of the quarterly and semi-annual funds and reports p value of the difference in the
means of quarterly and semi-annual funds.
We see that the semi funds are considerably bigger in size(TNA) compared to the
quarterly funds. This may be because big funds are more exposed to activities such
as front running and they prefer to disclose less often to minimize their trading cost.
The expense ratio of the semi-annual funds seems to be higher than that of the
quarterly funds. If we can take expense ratio to be a proxy for agency cost, we
probably can infer that funds who are more likely to incur agency cost are the ones
more likely to disclose less frequently. But expense ratio includes marketing and
distribution cost, and higher marketing expenses may not necessarily lead to poor
performance.
The annual turnover ratio of semi-annual funds seem to be higher than that of
the quarterly funds. If we can consider turnover ratio to be a proxy for information
related trades, we probably can infer that funds engaged in more information based
trades prefer to be semi-annual.8
We see that flows to the semi-annual funds are more volatile. It may be because
funds experiencing volatile flow strategically disclose less frequently to counter flow
based front running.
8see Ge & Zheng (2006) for a discussion on expense ratio, turnover ratio etc.
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Lastly semi-annual funds appear to be holding more number of stocks and are
younger compared to their quarterly counterparts.
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Frequency of Disclosure and Mutual Fund Performance
We divide our sample into two periods - between 1990 and 2003 and between 2005
and 2008 - and compare the performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds in each
of these periods.
Before 2004
First, we identify the semi-annual and quarterly funds during 1990-2003. Every month
we rank the funds into quintiles based on their past 12 month abnormal returns using
the Carhart (1997)four factor model.The Carhart model has the following general
specification:
Ri,t−RF,t = αi+βi,M(RM,t−RF,t)+βi,SMBSMBt+βi,HMLHMLt+βi,MOMMOMt+i,t
where the dependent variable is the return of fund i in month t minus the risk-
free rate, and the independent variables are given by the returns of the following four
zero-investment factor portfolios. The term RM,t − RF,t denotes the excess return
of the market portfolio over the risk-free rate, SMB is the return difference between
small and large capitalization stocks, HML is the return difference between high and
low book-to-market stocks, and MOM is the return difference between stocks with
high and low past returns.9 The intercept of the model, αi, is Carhart’s measure of
9The factor returns are taken from Kenneth Frenchs Web site:
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abnormal performance. The CAPM uses only the market factor, while the Fama and
French model uses the first three factors.
We hold an equally weighted portfolio of the funds in a quintile for the next
one month. Then we regress these monthly portfolio returns on the market factor
(CAPM), three factors (Fama and French) and four factors (Carhart). The results
are reported in Table 3.3.
At the bottom of the table we see that there is no unconditional difference be-
tween the performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds. However top quintile
semi-annual funds outperform top quintile quarterly funds by 17-20 basis points a
month. This supports our conjecture that top quintile quarterly funds suffer more
from activities such as front running. We report results for mean raw returns, mean
excess returns in the first two columns. However we concentrate on the CAPM alpha,
three factor alpha and four factor alpha in the last three columns.
We do not find any significant difference between the performance of poorly per-
forming semi-annual and quarterly funds. This probably implies that any gain on
less front running for the semi-annual fund is negated by larger agency cost incurred
by the fund managers owing to less monitoring.
For robustness check we repeat the portfolio analysis for semi-annual and quarterly
funds who disclose semi-annually or quarterly for more than 80% of the time during
their existence. We find similar results as reported in table 3.4. The top quintile
semi funds outperform top quintile quarterly funds by 16-19 basis points a month.
And there is no significant difference in performance between the bottom quintile
semi-annual and quarterly funds. In unreported results we repeat this analysis for
frequency thresholds starting from 70% and increasing by steps of 1% and get similar
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data Library.
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findings. As a further step to check robustness of our results, we repeat the above
analysis by ranking the funds based on their past 12-month four factor abnormal
returns into deciles and compare the performance of the top and bottom decile semi-
annual funds with that of top and bottom deciles quarterly funds. We do not report
the results. However, the top decile semi-annual fund outperforms the top decile
quarterly fund by even a larger margin(by 24-28 basis point a month compared to
17-20 basis points a month earlier). There is no statistically significant difference in
performance between the bottom decile semi-annual and quarterly funds.
The results we obtain for the successful funds here is similar to Ge and Zheng(2006),
but we do not find their results for poorly performing funds. They examine the rela-
tionship between disclosure frequency and future fund performance conditioned upon
fund investment skills. They take past performance as a proxy for fund investment
skills and show that past winners who disclose less frequently outperform past win-
ners who disclose more frequently and past losers who disclose less frequently under
perform past losers who disclose more frequently. The difference in result for the
poorly performing funds could be attributed to the more recent data (our sample
spans from 1990-2003 and theirs from 1985-1999) and the different methodology we
use in this study.
After 2004
Between 1990 and 2003 we see that semi-annual successful funds outperform quarterly
successful funds by 17-20 basis points a month. This may be because semi-annual
successful funds were less exposed to activities such as front running. If this is true
we should expect the difference in performance (between semi-annual successful funds
and quarterly successful funds) to be reduced or become insignificant after 2004, as
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all the funds are required to disclose quarterly since then.
We compare the performance of previously (prior to 2004) semi-annual successful
funds with quarterly successful funds between 2005 and 2008. We rank the semi-
annual and quarterly funds into quintiles based on their four factor abnormal return
during the previous 12 months.We hold an equally weighted portfolio of the funds in
a quintile for the next one month. Then we regress these monthly portfolio returns
on the market factor (CAPM), three factors (Fama and French) and four factors
(Carhart).
We see in Table 3.5 that there is no statistical or economic significant difference in
performance between the semi-annual successful funds and quarterly successful funds
any more. The difference in abnormal returns has reduced from 17-20 basis points a
month prior to 2004 to 2-4 (none of which is statistically significant) basis points a
month after 2004.
In unreported analysis, we divide the sample period from 1990 to 2008 into three
– 1990-1997, 1998-2003 and 2005-2008. We find that the semi-annual successful funds
outperform the quarterly successful funds during the first two sub periods. However,
between 2005 and 2008, there is no significant difference in their (previously semi-
annual and quarterly funds) performances.
The increase of disclosure frequency after 2004 was expected to reduce the agency
cost in the previously semi-annual poorly performing funds and hence to improve their
performance. However this would also expose the funds to activities such as front
running and it was not obvious which effect would dominate.We compare the perfor-
mances of poorly performing semi-quarterly funds and poorly performing qtly-qtly
funds between 2005 and 2008. In Table 3.5 we do not find any significant difference
in their performance (as was the case prior to 2004). This suggests that any im-
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provement in the agency cost of the poorly performing previously semi-annual funds
after 2004 has probably been negated by the increase in the trading costs owing to
activities such as front running.
For robustness purposes we repeat the analysis for semi-annual and quarterly
funds, defined with a threshold of 80% and obtain similar results.There is no signifi-
cant difference in performance between the semi-annual successful funds and quarterly
successful funds any more. We rank the funds into deciles based on their past 12-
month four factor abnormal return and repeat the analysis. We again obtain similar
results.
The Difference-in-Difference Estimator
So far we have learned that successful semi-annual funds have a performance advan-
tage over successful quarterly funds prior to 2004. We also saw that this performance
advantage goes away after 2004. Now we need to establish that this is indeed caused
by the change in disclosure policy in 2004. In this sub-section we try to show that
through difference-in-difference and triple difference tests. We are able to implement
these tests because the change in the policy is an exogenous event, which affects only
the semi-annual funds (our treatment group) and not the quarterly funds (our control
group). As discussed before, for better identification of the impact of higher disclo-
sure frequency on performance, we focus on the successful semi-annual and quarterly
funds.
Table 3.6 shows results for the difference-in-difference test. Here our main variable
of interest is the double interaction term(Semii ∗ POST2004). In panel A, we have
restricted our sample to the successful funds only and in Panel B, to poorly performing
funds only. We can see that the above coefficient is negative and significant in Panel
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A and not significant in Panel B. This implies an performance drop of around 22 bps
a month after 2004 for the successful funds who were semi-annual before 2004. In
Panel B we do not see any such change in the performance of the poorly performing
funds which were semi-annual before 2004.
Table 3.7 shows results for the difference-in-difference-in-difference test. For this
test we use the whole sample of semi-annual and quarterly funds. Here our main
variables of interest are the triple interaction terms( Semii ∗POST2004 ∗Rank4i,t−1
and Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗ Rank0i,t−1 ). These are similar to the double interaction
term in Table 3.6. As we can see, the coefficient on Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗Rank4i,t−1
is negative and significant in all the specifications. This implies that successful funds
which were semi-annual before 2004 appear to have lost around 22-23 bps a month
after 2004. The coefficient on Semii ∗POST2004∗Rank0i,t−1 is not significant. And
this implies that the change in the regulation did not have any impact on the poorly
performing funds which were semi-annual before 2004.
These evidence support the hypothesis that successful previously semi-annual
funds are more exposed to activities such as front running after 2004 and this is
adversely affecting their performance. In the next section we will look at the cross-
section of semi-annual and quarterly funds and will give further evidence in support
of this argument.
3.5.2 Frequency of Disclosure, Mutual Fund Performance
and Illiquid Fund Holdings
In this section we test our second hypothesis which says that the change in the
disclosure policy will affect the funds holding illiquid assets (Illiquid Funds) more
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than funds holding liquid assets(Liquid Funds).
First, we examine if there is any difference in the performance between the illiquid
semi-annual and illiquid quarterly funds prior to the policy change. We then go on
to implement a difference-in-difference test to see if the performance of the successful
previously semi-annual illiquid funds has come down after the policy change in 2004.
We repeat the above exercise for liquid semi-annual and quarterly funds. At the end
we implement difference-in-difference tests for small cap and large cap funds.
Relative performance of Illiquid and Liquid semi-annual and quarterly
Funds before 2004
We identify the illiquid and liquid semi-annual and quarterly funds following the
methods explained in sections 3.4. Every month we rank these funds into tertiles
based on their past 12 month abnormal returns using the Carhart (1997)four factor
model. We hold an equally weighted portfolio of the funds in a tertile for the next one
month. We regress these monthly portfolio returns on the market factor (CAPM),
three factors (Fama and French) and four factors (Carhart).
Table 3.8 shows the results for the performance difference between illiquid semi-
annual and illiquid quarterly funds in Panel A and between liquid semi-annual and
liquid quarterly funds in Panel B. We can see that the successful semi-annual illiquid
funds have significant 3-factor and 4-factor performance advantage (of around 33
basis points) over their quarterly counter parts. We do not see any such difference
for the liquid successful funds. This lend credence to the hypothesis that illiquid
quarterly funds attract more front runners and hence suffer more compared to the
illiquid semi-annual funds.
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The Difference-in-Difference Test for the Illiquid Funds
We just learned that successful illiquid semi-annual funds have a performance ad-
vantage over successful illiquid quarterly funds prior to 2004. In this section we will
examine the impact of the change in disclosure policy in 2004 on the performance of
illiquid semi-annual funds through difference-in-difference and triple difference tests.
We are able to implement these tests because the change in the policy is an exogenous
event, which affects only the semi-annual illiquid funds (our treatment group) and
not the quarterly illiquid funds (our control group). As discussed before, for better
identification of the impact of higher disclosure frequency on performance, we focus
on the successful semi-annual and quarterly illiquid funds.
Table 3.9 shows results for difference-in-difference estimation for the successful
illiquid funds in Panel A and poorly performing illiquid funds in Panel B (the sample
has been restricted to the successful illiquid funds for Panel A and poorly performing
illiquid funds for Panel B). As discussed earlier the coefficient of interest is that of
the double interaction term(Semii ∗ POST2004). We can see that it is negative and
significant for the successful illiquid semi-annual funds (Panel A) and insignificant
for the poorly performing illiquid semi-annual funds(in Panel B). This result (about
-34 bps a month) is similar but stronger than the results we had obtained for the
whole sample of successful semi-annul funds(about -22 bps a month). This further
supports the hypothesis that successful semi-annual funds, particularly illiquid funds
suffer more from activities such as front running after the policy change in 2004.
Table 3.10 shows results for the triple difference test for the illiquid funds. For
this test we use the whole sample of semi-annual and quarterly illiquid funds. Here
our main variables of interest are the triple interaction terms( Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗
Rank2i,t−1 and Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗ Rank0i,t−1 ).These are similar to the double
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interaction term in Table 3.9. As we can see, the coefficient on Semii ∗ POST2004 ∗
Rank2i,t−1 is negative and significant in all the specifications. This implies that
successful illiquid funds who were semi-annual before 2004 appear to have lost around
36 bps a month after 2004. The coefficient on Semii ∗POST2004 ∗Rank0i,t−1 is not
significant. And this implies that the change in the regulation did not have any net
impact on the poorly performing illiquid funds who were semi-annual before 2004.
The Difference-in-Difference Test for the Liquid Funds
We repeat the tests for the liquid funds. The results are reported in the tables 3.11
and 3.12. We do not find the results we find for the illiquid funds. In fact in Table
3.12 we find some improvement in performance for the successful previously semi-
annual funds and deterioration in performance for the poorly performing previously
semi-annual funds.
The Difference-in-Difference Test for Small Cap and Large Cap Funds
In this subsection we use illiquid and liquid funds identified based on their investment
styles. small cap funds primarily invest in small cap stocks which are relatively illiquid
and large cap funds primarily invest in large cap stocks which are relatively liquid.
Our hypothesis would predict that the change in frequency will have a higher impact
on the small cap funds compared to the large cap funds.
We conduct similar tests on these funds as we did in the previous section. Table
3.13 shows the results. We see that the results for the small cap fund is similar to
what we had previously obtained for illiquid funds. The performance of successful
previously semi-annual small cap fund has gone down by around 36 bps a month
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after 2004. And there appears to be no impact of the change in disclosure frequency
on the performance of successful previously semi-annual large cap funds. Similarly
we do not find any net impact on the performance of poorly performing previously
semi-annual small cap and large cap funds.
3.5.3 Frequency of Disclosure, Mutual Fund Performance
and Size of the Funds
In this subsection, we turn our attention to asset under management. From the
descriptive statistics of the funds, we see that the semi-annual funds are significantly
larger than the quarterly funds. Ge and Zheng (2006) show that large funds are more
likely to disclose less frequently . So it is likely that prior to 2004 successful large funds
which disclose less frequently will outperform successful large funds which discloses
more frequently by a bigger margin. That is the relative performance between semi-
annual and quarterly funds will increase with asset under management.
To test this we rank both the semi-annual and quarterly funds based on their
past 12 months (four factor) abnormal return. We choose only the top quintile semi-
annual and quarterly funds from the sample. We again rank these top quintile funds
based on their total net assets. As we are doing a double sort, we consider funds
between 1998-2003 to have more number of funds in each size groups. In all, we have
33011 observations for quarterly funds (693 unique funds) and 15220 observations for
the semi-annual funds(339 unique funds). We compare the performance of successful
semi-annual funds with that of successful quarterly funds in the same size(TNA)
group.
In panel A of the Table 3.14, we divide the successful semi-annual and quarterly
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funds into three groups based on their recent size(TNA) and hold an equally weighted
portfolio of funds in each group for the next month. We report the mean raw return,
mean excess return, CAPM alpha, three factor alpha and four factor alpha.
We see that the magnitude of the outperformance of successful semi-annual funds
over successful quarterly funds increases almost monotonically over the size of the
funds. For example for the 3 factor regression it is 7 basis points a month for the
lowest size group and 37 basis points for the highest size group.
In panel B we divide the successful funds into two groups based on their recent
size(TNA) and repeat the same exercise. We find similar results. The out performance
of the semi-annual funds in the bigger size group is more than double that of the
smaller size group.
The results support our conjecture that successful large funds are more exposed
to activities such as front running and incur more on trading costs compared to suc-
cessful small funds. The results are economically significant and of mixed statistical
significance.
After 2004, we do not find any difference in performance between the semi-annual
and quarterly successful funds and also, we do not find any relationship between their
size and relative performance.
3.5.4 Frequency of Disclosure and Return Gap
As a robustness check in this section we study if semi-annual and quarterly funds
differ in creating or destroying value relative to the previously disclosed holdings.
Kacperczyk, Sialm & Zheng(2007) estimate the impact of unobserved actions on
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fund returns using a measure they call return gap. It is the difference between the
reported fund return and the return on a portfolio that invests in the previously
disclosed fund holdings. They document that unobserved actions of some funds per-
sistently create value, while such actions of other funds destroy value. Their main
result shows that return gap is persistent and it predicts future fund performance.
We conjecture that activities such as front running and in certain circumstances
free riding will affect firms’ abilities to create value relative to the previously disclosed
holdings. Copycat and front running strategies are less effective against the semi-
annual funds compared to the quarterly funds and to the extent these strategies
affect only the fund returns and not the holding period returns, we will see return gaps
of the semi-annual successful funds to be persistently higher than that of quarterly
successful funds.
For the poorly performing semi-annual funds, the advantage of less front running
may be negated by more value destroying activities by the fund manager (as a result
of less monitoring by the investors ) and it is not obvious if the return gap of the
semi-annual poor funds will be different from that of the quarterly poor funds.
Persistence of difference in Return Gap between the semi-annual and quar-
terly funds
In this section we examine if there is any difference in the monthly return gap between
the successful10 semi-annual funds and successful quarterly funds and if this difference
persist over time. If there is a systematic difference between both the groups then we
would expect the relative return gap to persist over time.
10In this section a successful fund means a fund who belongs to the top quintile / decile of the
funds sorted on past 12-month average return gap.Similarly a poorly performing fund belongs to the
bottom quintile / decile.
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We rank the funds based on their lagged 12-month average return gap and report
equally weighted return gap for each quintile group in the Table 3.15.We find that
the return gaps of the top quintile semi-annual funds are more than double that of
the top quintile quarterly funds. This difference persists over a period of 24 months.
This suggests a systematic difference in the abilities of these two groups of funds in
creating value relative to the last disclosed holdings and we attribute this to the less
exposure of semi-annual funds to activities such as front running.
We do not find any such difference between the poorly performing funds in both
the groups. This supports our conjecture that for semi-annual poor funds the positive
effect on the return gap owing to less effective front running is negated by the value
destroying activities by the managers.
To confirm that this persistent difference in the return gap captures a systematic
difference in both the groups of funds, we test if this difference in return gap between
the successful semi-annual and successful quarterly funds predict any difference in
their future performance.
Predictability based on difference in Return Gap
We examine the performance of a trading strategy based on the past return gap
difference between the successful semi-annual funds and successful quarterly funds.
We sort semi-annual and quarterly funds in our sample into deciles according to their
average monthly return gap during the previous 12 months (with a lag of 2 month to
allow for the 60 days lag in the reporting requirements). We then compute for each
month the average subsequent monthly return by weighting all the funds in a decile
equally. Table 3.16 show that one can earn between 24 to 34 basis points a month by
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going long on the top decile semi-annual funds and short on the top decile quarterly
funds.
This tables establish that value creation by the successful funds relative to the
previous disclosed holdings is hampered by activities such as front running by other
agents in the market.We do not find any statistically and economically significant
difference in the performance between poorly performing semi-annual and quarterly
funds. It suggests that any gain for the poorly performing semi-annual funds from
activities such as front running is negated by more agency cost / value destruction.
This difference in return gap between semi-annual and quarterly funds disappear
after 2004.
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3.6 Conclusion
To our knowledge this is the first paper that examines the performance of mutual
funds before and after the regulatory change in the disclosure frequency in 2004. We
show that successful semi-annual funds had a distinct performance advantage over
successful quarterly funds prior to the policy change. This advantage disappears
after 2004. The reduction in performance is higher for semi-annual funds holding
illiquid assets than those holding liquid assets. This suggests that semi-annual funds
are more exposed to activities such as front running after 2004.
One would have expected the change in policy to help reduce the agency cost of
poorly managed semi-annual funds. However, we do not find any improvement in the
performance of the previously semi-annual poorly performing funds (funds, in which
the agency problem should have been be higher). This suggests that any improvement
in the agency cost of the poorly performing previously semi-annual funds after 2004
has been negated by the increase in the trading costs owing to activities such as front
running.
Our results have implications for any change in the disclosure frequency in the
future, for example from quarterly to monthly. Policy makers will have to strike a
balance between potential advantages of more frequent portfolio disclosure and the
possible harmful side-effects coming from activities such as front-running.
Lastly, our results could also be interpreted as indirect evidence in support of
activities such as front running taking place in the market. Prior works in front-
running literature have so far focused on the the agents who front run or profit
accruing from hypothetical front-running strategies. In this paper we complement
those by showing the impact of these sorts of activities on the performance of the
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mutual funds.
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics
This table displays the mean, median, standard deviation, the 25th and the 75th percentile
of total net assets, number of stock holding, expense ratio, new money flow, annual turnover
and age of the funds for the whole sample in panel A, and for the quarterly and the semi-
annual funds in panel B and C respectively. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if
it discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its
existence. We calculate new money flow as follows: flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
Panel A: All mean median Std Dev 25% 75%
TNA in million 905 918 381 522 1227
No of stocks 114 117 21 102 129
Expense ratio 1.30% 1.30% 0.07% 1.28% 1.34%
Flow 3.98% 2.29% 8.15% 1.34% 3.52%
Turn over 91% 88.50% 13.70% 80.50% 101%
Age 15.4 9.58 15.3 4.58 21.5
Panel B: Qtly mean median Std Dev 25% 75%
TNA in million 948 988 382 633 1252
No of stocks 90 86 16 81 107
Expense ratio 1.30% 1.30% 0.08% 1.27% 1.34%
Flow 2.77% 1.55% 14.55% 0.75% 2.19%
Turn over 82% 78.00% 16.50% 68.00% 95%
Age 17 16.2 3.63 12.74 20.27
Panel C: Semi mean median Std Dev 25% 75%
TNA in million 1248 1239 559 741 1686
No of stocks 114 113 31 90.5 135
Expense ratio 1.41% 1.38% 0.15% 1.30% 1.42%
Flow 7.33% 2.55% 23.16% 1.12% 4.63%
Turn over 117% 116.00% 12.00% 111.00% 121%
Age 12.52 12.62 0.868 12.27 13.12
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Semi-annual Vs. Quarterly Funds
This table compares the average total net asset(TNA), number of stock holdings, ex-
pense ratio, number of unique funds, new money flow, annual turn over and age of
all the funds in the sample with that of the quarterly and semi-annual funds. We
call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three
months) at least 75% of the time during its existence. We calculate new money flow as
follows:flowi,t =
(
TNAi,t−TNAi,t−1∗(1+reti,t)
TNAi,t−1
)
All Qtly Semi Qtly-Semi p value
No of funds 2901 777 392
TNA in million 905 948 1248 -338 < 0.0001
No of stocks 114 90 114 -24 < 0.0001
Expense ratio 1.30% 1.30% 1.41% -0.11% < 0.0001
Flow 3.98% 2.77% 7.33% -4.43% 0.046
Turn over 91% 82% 117% -35% < 0.0001
Age 15.4 17 12.518 4.48 < 0.0001
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Table 3.3: Disclosure Frequency and Fund Performance (1990-2003)
This table reports mean monthly returns for quintile portfolio of mutual funds sorted on
their past 12 month abnormal return during the period 1990-2003. We use the four factor
model of Carhart (1997) to determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table reports
results for all the funds in the sample and for semi-annual and quarterly funds separately.
At the end it reports the difference in performance between semi-annual funds and quarterly
funds. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every
three months) at least 75% of the time during its whole life span. In the second column
we show the mean raw return, in the third, the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth and the
last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French and four factor
alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and
indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent
significance level.
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
All the Funds 0 0.73** -0.21** -0.21* -0.31*** -0.26**
1 0.84** -0.11* -0.08 -0.15** -0.12**
2 0.9** -0.05 -0.01 -0.08* -0.06
3 0.96** 0.01 0.04 -0.02 -0.03
4 1.2** 0.27* 0.23 0.23** 0.13
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.74** -0.2* -0.19* -0.28** -0.23**
1 0.83** -0.12* -0.08 -0.16** -0.12**
2 0.88** -0.07 -0.03 -0.1** -0.07
3 0.95** 0 0.04 -0.02 -0.04
4 1.2** 0.25* 0.21 0.19** 0.11
Semi Funds 0 0.71* -0.24* -0.25* -0.37*** -0.32**
1 0.87** -0.08 -0.06 -0.14* -0.12
2 0.89** -0.06 -0.03 -0.1 -0.1
3 1** 0.09 0.09 0.03 -0.01
4 1.4*** 0.46** 0.4** 0.39** 0.28**
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09
s-q (1) 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 0
s-q (2) 0.01 0.01 0 0 -0.03
s-q (3) 0.05 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.03
s-q (4) 0.2** 0.21** 0.19** 0.2** 0.17**
s-q 0.054 0.062 0.04 0.036 0.016
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Table 3.4: Disclosure Frequency and Fund Performance (1990-2003) Contd.
This table reports mean monthly returns for quintile portfolio of mutual funds sorted on
their past 12 month abnormal return during the period 1990-2003. We use the four factor
model of Carhart (1997) to determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table reports
results for all the funds in the sample and for semi-annual and quarterly funds separately.
At the end it reports the difference in performance between semi-annual funds and quarterly
funds. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every
three months) at least 80% of the time during its whole life span. In the second column
we show the mean raw return, in the third, the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth and the
last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French and four factor
alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and
indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent
significance level.
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.74** -0.21* -0.21* -0.29** -0.23**
1 0.84** -0.11 -0.08 -0.15** -0.12*
2 0.84** -0.1* -0.07 -0.14** -0.11**
3 0.94** -0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.04
4 1.2** 0.25* 0.21 0.19** 0.12
Semi Funds 0 0.78** -0.17 -0.17 -0.31** -0.25**
1 0.86** -0.09 -0.05 -0.15* -0.13
2 0.93** -0.02 0.01 -0.06 -0.07
3 1** 0.09 0.09 0.03 -0.01
4 1.4*** 0.45** 0.4** 0.37** 0.28**
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.02
s-q (1) 0.02 0.02 0.03 0 -0.01
s-q (2) 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.04
s-q (3) 0.06 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.03
s-q (4) 0.2** 0.2** 0.19** 0.18** 0.16*
s-q 0.082** 0.088** 0.082** 0.062* 0.04
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Table 3.5: Disclosure Frequency and Fund Performance (2005-2008)
This table reports mean monthly returns for quintile portfolios of mutual funds sorted
on past 12 month abnormal fund return during the period 2005-2008. We use the four
factor model of Carhart (1997) to determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table
reports results for previously semi-annual and quarterly funds separately. It also reports
the difference in performance between previously semi-annual and quarterly funds. We call
a fund previously semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months (or every three
months) at least 75% of the time during its existence prior to 2004. In the second column
we show the mean raw return, in the third the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth and the
last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French and four factor
alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and
indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent
significance level
past perf rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 -0.62 -0.27** -0.21** -0.21** -0.2**
1 -0.54 -0.18** -0.18** -0.18** -0.16**
2 -0.41 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.06
3 -0.4 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.07
4 -0.32 0.03 0.07 0.11 -0.03
Semi Funds 0 -0.7 -0.35** -0.31** -0.27** -0.27**
1 -0.47 -0.12 -0.13 -0.09 -0.08
2 -0.43 -0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06
3 -0.4 -0.05 -0.03 -0.01 -0.11**
4 -0.3 0.05 0.11 0.15 -0.01
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) -0.08 -0.08 -0.1 -0.06 -0.07
s-q (1) 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.09* 0.08
s-q (2) -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01 0
s-q (3) 0 0 0 0 -0.04
s-q (4) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02
s-q -0.002 -0.004 0.002 0.016 -0.002
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Table 3.6: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Mutual Fund Performance:
the Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as
dependent variable. Semii is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if a fund i is
semi-annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator
value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. Expense ratio
and Total net assets are control variables and are lagged by a month. Panel A shows the
results for the successful funds (funds which are in the top quintiles according to the past
12-month four factor abnormal returns) funds and panel B shows the results for the poorly
performing funds (funds which are in the bottom quintiles according to the past 12-month
four factor abnormal returns). We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard
errors.
Panel A Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept 0.364 0.13 2.8 0.0053
Semi 0.19 0.079 2.4 0.0168
POST2004 -0.255 0.123 -2.08 0.0379
Semi*POST2004 -0.228 0.104 -2.2 0.028
Expense ratio -6.988 1.926 -3.63 0.0003
Total net asset -0.019 0.014 -1.36 0.1744
observations 18190
R-squared 0.019
Panel B Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept -0.09 0.14 -0.64 0.5222
Semi 0.021 0.086 0.25 0.8049
POST2004 0.213 0.142 1.5 0.1343
Semi*POST2004 -0.061 0.125 -0.49 0.6237
Expense ratio -15.856 3.005 -5.28 ¡.0001
Total net asset -0.006 0.016 -0.35 0.7298
observations 18530
R-squared 0.005
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Table 3.7: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Mutual Fund Performance:
the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as
dependent variable. Semii is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-
annual between 1990 and 2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value
and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. rank4 is an indicator
variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the top quintiles according to the past
12-month four factor abnormal return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0 is an indicator
variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs to the bottom quintile according to the past
12-month four factor abnormal return and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of the
fund according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return.Expense ratio and Total
net assets are control variables and are lagged by a month. We include year dummies and
use panel corrected standard errors.The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and
indicate whether the results ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent
significance level.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.172** 0.047 0.152** 0.069 0.219** -0.035
rank4*Semi*POST2004 -0.236** -0.235** -0.225* -0.223*
rank0*Semi*POST2004 -0.048 -0.049 0.012 0.009
rank4 0.205*** 0.105** 0.223*** 0.117**
rank0 -0.073* 0.026 -0.123** 0.088*
rank4*Semi 0.201** 0.201** 0.199** 0.198**
rank0*Semi 0.01 0.011 -0.043 -0.039
Semi -0.002 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.051* 0.047
Semi*POST2004 -0.006 -0.005 -0.018 -0.018 -0.068* -0.064*
POST2004 -0.054 -0.054 -0.066 -0.064 -0.072 -0.073
rank4*POST2004 -0.033 -0.034 -0.035 -0.036
rank0*POST2004 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.016
Expense ratio -14.014*** -13.946*** -14.318*** -13.937*** -13.478*** -13.7***
Total net asset -0.011** -0.012** -0.01* -0.012** -0.012** -0.012**
perf 0.251*** 0.215*** 0.428***
observations 93123 93123 93123 93123 93123 93123
R-squared 0.0109 0.011 0.0108 0.011 0.01 0.0107
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Table 3.8: Disclosure Frequency and Illiquid & Liquid Mutual Fund Performance
This table reports mean monthly returns for tertile portfolio of Illiquid mutual funds in
Panel A and Liquid mutual funds in Panel B, sorted on their past 12 month abnormal
return during the period 1990-2003. We use the four factor model of Carhart (1997) to
determine past 12-month abnormal return. The table reports results for semi-annual and
quarterly funds separately and their performance difference. We call a fund illiquid if value
weighted average gibb’ estimate of its individual holdings on the recent report date is in the
top tertile and liquid if it is in the bottom tertile. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly)
if it discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its
whole life span. In the second column we show the mean raw return, in the third, the mean
excess return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha
of Fama and French and four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The significance
levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate statistically different
from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Panel A Illiquid Funds
past perf Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.81 -0.14 -0.22 -0.31** -0.3**
1 0.94* 0 -0.09 -0.18* -0.22**
2 1.3** 0.35 0.22 0.22 0.07
Semi Funds 0 0.71 -0.24 -0.37 -0.42** -0.41**
1 1* 0.1 -0.06 0.01 -0.15
2 1.5** 0.55 0.34 0.54** 0.4*
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) -0.1 -0.1 -0.15 -0.11 -0.11
s-q (1) 0.1 0.1 0.03 0.19* 0.07
s-q (2) 0.2 0.2 0.12 0.32** 0.33**
s-q 0.05 0.07 0 0.13 0.1
Panel B Liquid Funds
past perf Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.75** -0.2 -0.08 -0.22*** -0.15**
1 0.85** -0.09 0.02 -0.09* -0.03
2 0.91*** -0.03 0.1 -0.04 0
Semi Funds 0 0.82** -0.12 0.02 -0.13 -0.06
1 0.89** -0.06 0.05 -0.07 -0.02
2 0.98*** 0.03 0.18 0.01 0.01
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.07 0.08 0.1** 0.09* 0.09*
s-q (1) 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01
s-q (2) 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.05 0.01
s-q 0.06 0.06 0.07* 0.05* 0.04
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Table 3.9: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Illiquid Mutual Fund Perfor-
mance: the Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as
dependent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the illiquid funds only. Semii is
an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003
and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is
later than 2004 and zero otherwise. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables
and are lagged by a month. Panel A shows results for the successful funds only(funds
which are in the top quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns)
and panel B shows the results for the poorly performing funds only(funds which are in the
bottom quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns). We include
year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors.
Panel A Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept -0.35 0.29 -1.21 0.2252
Semi 0.21* 0.12 1.81 0.0711
POST2004 0.179 0.29 0.62 0.5324
Semi*POST2004 -0.341** 0.16 -2.1 0.0365
Expense ratio -10.042*** 2.11 -4.77 ¡.0001
Total net assets -0.009 0.02 -0.36 0.72
Observations 9050
R-Square .017
Panel B Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept 0.103 0.296 0.35 0.7272
Semi -0.042 0.147 -0.29 0.7741
POST2004 0.071 0.299 0.24 0.8116
Semi*POST2004 0.038 0.188 0.2 0.8408
Expense ratio -14.799*** 0.93 -15.91 ¡.0001
Total net assets -0.028 0.022 -1.25 0.2115
Observations 9072
R-Square 0.014
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Table 3.10: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Illiquid Mutual Fund per-
formance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as
dependent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the illiquid funds only. Semii
is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and
2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one
if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. rank2 is an indicator variable and takes a value
one if a fund belongs to the top tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal
return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if
a fund belongs to the bottom tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal
return and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of the fund according to the past 12-
month four factor abnormal return. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables
and are lagged by a month. We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard
errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results
ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
1 2 3 4
Intercept -0.141 -0.2 0.014 -0.481***
perf 0.189 0.765***
rank2*Semi*POST2004 -0.368* -0.366*
rank0*Semi*POST2004 0.27 0.266
rank2 0.359*** 0.266**
rank0 -0.137* 0.235***
rank2*Semi 0.19 0.187
rank0*Semi -0.272* -0.259*
Semi 0.058 0.058 0.215*** 0.203***
Semi*POST2004 -0.01 -0.01 -0.228** -0.22**
POST2004 0.036 0.039 -0.048 -0.04
rank2*POST2004 -0.168** -0.169**
rank0*POST2004 0.076 0.084
Expense ratio -14.263*** -14.137*** -13.792*** -13.957***
Total net assets -0.021* -0.023* -0.02 -0.024*
Observations 27564 27564 27564 27564
R-Square 0.012 0.013 .011 .012
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Table 3.11: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Liquid Mutual Fund Per-
formance: the Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as
dependent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the liquid funds only. Semii is
an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and 2003
and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is
later than 2004 and zero otherwise. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables
and are lagged by a month. Panel A shows the results for the successful funds only(funds
which are in the top quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns)
and panel B shows the results for the poorly performing funds only(funds which are in the
bottom quintiles according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal returns). We include
year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors.
Panel A Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept -0.061 0.145 -0.42 0.6732
Semi 0.031 0.059 0.52 0.6066
POST2004 -0.029 0.154 -0.19 0.8499
Semi*POST2004 0.111 0.08 1.39 0.1661
Expense ratio -1.956 4.486 -0.44 0.6631
Total net assets 0 0.009 0.03 0.9733
Observations 8987
R-Square 0.014
Panel B Coefficient Std Error t value p value
Intercept 0.769 0.779 0.99 0.3245
Semi 0.052 0.073 0.72 0.4744
POST2004 -0.252 0.747 -0.34 0.736
Semi*POST2004 -0.12 0.096 -1.25 0.2137
Expense ratio -19.746*** 6.145 -3.21 0.0014
Total net assets -0.008 0.01 -0.78 0.4362
Observations 8794
R-Square 0.014
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Table 3.12: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Liquid Mutual Fund Per-
formance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return as
dependent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the liquid funds only. Semii
is an indicator variable and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1990 and
2003 and zero if it is quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one
if t is later than 2004 and zero otherwise. rank2 is an indicator variable and takes a value
one if a fund belongs to the top tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal
return and zero otherwise. Similarly rank0 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if
a fund belongs to the bottom tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal
return and zero otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of the fund according to the past 12-
month four factor abnormal return. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables
and are lagged by a month. We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard
errors. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results
ate statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.198 0.181 0.16 0.129 0.196 0.132
perf 0.034 0.078 0.099
rank2*Semi*POST2004 0.103 0.102 0.166* 0.166*
rank0*Semi*POST2004 -0.133 -0.133 -0.182* -0.183*
rank2 0.011 0 0.052 0.015
rank0 -0.087* -0.076 -0.093 -0.045
rank2*Semi 0.078 0.078 0.026 0.025
rank0*Semi 0.109 0.109 0.069 0.071
Semi -0.052 -0.052 -0.012 -0.014
Semi*POST2004 0.012 0.013 -0.051 -0.051 0.061 0.063
POST2004 -0.009 -0.009 0.037 0.038 -0.018 -0.017
rank2*POST2004 -0.015 -0.016 -0.061 -0.063
rank0*POST2004 0.096* 0.096* 0.104 0.105
Expense ratio -10.666*** -10.645*** -11.042*** -10.626*** -10.092*** -10.222***
Total net asset 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 27210 27210 27210 27210 27210 27210
R-Square .014 .014 .014 .014 .014 .014
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Table 3.13: The Impact of Change in Disclosure Frequency on Small Cap & Large Cap
Mutual Fund Performance: the Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Test
This tables shows the results of the regression with monthly four factor abnormal return
as dependent variable. Here the sample has been restricted to the Small Cap funds in
column 1 an 2 and to Large Cap funds in column 3 and 4. Semii is an indicator variable
and takes a value of one if fund i is semi-annual between 1993 and 2003 and zero if it is
quarterly. POST2004 is an indicator value and takes a value of one if t is later than 2004
and zero otherwise. rank2 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs
to the top tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return and zero
otherwise. Similarly rank0 is an indicator variable and takes a value one if a fund belongs
to the bottom tertile according to the past 12-month four factor abnormal return and zero
otherwise. Perf is the percentile rank of the fund according to the past 12-month four
factor abnormal return. Expense ratio and Total net assets are control variables and are
lagged by a month. We include year dummies and use panel corrected standard errors. The
significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results ate statistically
different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Small Cap Funds Large Cap Funds
1 2 3 4
Intercept -0.151 -0.347 -0.468** -0.426**
perf 0.34*** 0.746** 0.205*** 0.18**
rank2*Semi*POST2004 -0.366** 0.023
rank0*Semi*POST2004 0.151 -0.036
rank2 0.164** 0.029
rank0 0.158* -0.044
rank2*Semi 0.328** -0.018
rank0*Semi -0.163 0.074
Semi -0.165** -0.012 -0.037 -0.067**
Semi*POST2004 0.166* 0.002 0.015 0.034
POST2004 0.041 -0.033 0.42** 0.348*
rank2*POST2004 -0.152** -0.134***
rank0*POST2004 0.072 0.082
Total net asset -0.014 -0.015 -0.008* -0.009*
Expense ratio -6.91** -6.829** -2.057 -2.259
Observation 25457 25457 33050 33050
R squared .01 .01 .01 .01
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Table 3.14: The Impact of Fund Size on Successful Fund Performance
This table reports results for the test to examine if the asset under management (TNA) has
implications for the trading costs of a fund. Our sample covers 1998-2003 for this test. We
rank both the semi-annual and quarterly funds based on their past 12 months four factor
abnormal return and choose only the top quintile semi-annual and quarterly funds from
the sample. Then we rank these top quintile funds based on their recent total net assets
into three groups (funds with rank 2 are the largest) and hold equally weighted portfolio
of funds in each group for the next one month. In Panel A, the second column reports
mean raw return, third column, the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth and the last columns
report the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French and four factor alpha of
Carhart (1997) respectively. It also reports the relative performance of semi-annual funds
over the quarterly funds. Next we rank these top quintile funds based on their recent total
net assets into two groups (funds with rank 1 are larger) and hold equally weighted portfolio
of funds in each group for the next one month. The mean and abnormal return of these
two portfolios for the semi-annual funds and quarterly funds are reported in Panel B. The
significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results are statistically
different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level.
Successful Semi-annual Vs Successful Quarterly Funds
Panel A past size rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly funds 0 0.94 0.46 0.44 0.29 0.21
1 1.1 0.61** 0.59* 0.4** 0.3
2 0.85 0.36 0.34 0.22 0.09
Semi funds 0 1 0.54** 0.53** 0.36* 0.36
1 1.2 0.75** 0.74** 0.58** 0.4
2 1.1 0.65 0.6 0.59* 0.38
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.15
s-q (1) 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.18 0.1
s-q (2) 0.25 0.29 0.26 0.37* 0.29
Panel B past size rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly funds 0 1 0.54* 0.53* 0.37* 0.28
1 0.89 0.41 0.39 0.24 0.12
Semi funds 0 1.1 0.61** 0.6** 0.46** 0.39*
1 1.2 0.68 0.65 0.56** 0.36
Semi-Qtly s-q (0) 0.1 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.11
s-q (1) 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.32** 0.24*
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Table 3.15: The Persistence in Difference of Return Gap
The table below reports mean monthly return gaps for quintile portfolios sorted by their
average lagged return gaps during the previous 12 months in Panel A, 18 months in Panel
B and 24 months in Panel C over the period 1990-2003. First column reports the return
gap for all the funds in the sample, second column for the semi-annual funds, third column
for the quarterly funds and the last column reports the difference in monthly return gaps
between semi-annual and quarterly funds. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it
discloses every six months (or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its whole
life span. The return gap is defined as the difference between the reported fund return and
the return on a portfolio that invests in previously disclosed fund holdings. The returns are
reported in percentage per month. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and
indicate whether the results are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent
significance level.
All Semi Qtly Semi-Qtly
Panel A(12)
0 -0.161*** -0.132*** -0.158*** 0.026
1 -0.066*** -0.037* -0.067*** 0.03
2 -0.047*** -0.04** -0.054*** 0.014
3 -0.023** -0.013 -0.033** 0.019
4 0.098*** 0.171*** 0.065*** 0.106**
Panel B(18)
0 -0.165*** -0.175*** -0.157*** -0.018
1 -0.072*** -0.045** -0.082*** 0.037
2 -0.041*** -0.033* -0.054*** 0.021
3 -0.023** 0.046* -0.032** 0.077
4 0.094*** 0.178*** 0.081*** 0.097**
Panel C (24)
0 -0.15*** -0.143*** -0.157*** 0.015
1 -0.069*** -0.055** -0.06*** 0.005
2 -0.042*** -0.029 -0.057*** 0.028
3 -0.017* 0.018 -0.02 0.037
4 0.071*** 0.153*** 0.066** 0.087*
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Table 3.16: Return Gap Predicts Performance
This table reports the mean monthly returns for decile portfolios of semi-annual and quar-
terly funds sorted according to their lagged 12-month return gaps over the period 1990-2003.
It also reports the difference in performance of semi-annual and quarterly funds. Here we
have allowed for a two month lag for the disclosed portfolios to be made public so that this
trading strategy can be implemented in practice. The return gap is defined as the differ-
ence between the reported return and the holding returns of the portfolio disclosed in the
previous period. We call a fund semi-annual (or quarterly) if it discloses every six months
(or every three months) at least 75% of the time during its whole life span. In the second
column we show the mean raw return, in the third the mean excess return. Fourth, fifth
and the last columns show the CAPM alpha, three factor alpha of Fama and French and
four factor alpha of Carhart (1997) respectively. The returns are reported in percentage per
month. The significance levels are denoted by *, **, *** and indicate whether the results
are statistically different from zero at the 10-, 5- and 1-percent significance level
lag3 past rg rank Raw Ret Ex Ret CAPM 3F 4F
Qtly Funds 0 0.73** -0.21* -0.21* -0.19* -0.25**
1 0.85** -0.1 -0.08 -0.11 -0.12*
2 0.94** -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.05
3 0.87** -0.07 -0.04 -0.13** -0.1*
4 0.91** -0.04 0 -0.11 -0.06
5 0.94** 0 0.04 -0.04 -0.01
6 0.93** -0.02 0.02 -0.09 -0.05
7 1** 0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.01
8 1** 0.07 0.07 0.01 0
9 0.99** 0.04 0 -0.04 -0.07
Semi Funds 0 0.68* -0.26 -0.26 -0.25** -0.3**
1 0.85** -0.09 -0.1 -0.12 -0.19**
2 0.95** 0 0.01 -0.04 -0.08
3 1** 0.05 0.05 -0.07 -0.08
4 0.97** 0.03 0.05 -0.05 -0.03
5 1** 0.08 0.1 0 0.01
6 1.1** 0.13 0.15 0.04 0.06
7 0.97** 0.02 0.03 -0.11 -0.09
8 1.1** 0.12 0.11 0.01 -0.01
9 1.3** 0.35 0.24 0.3* 0.17
Semi-Qtly semi-qly(0) -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05
semi-qly(1) 0 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.07
semi-qly(2) 0.01 0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03
semi-qly(3) 0.13 0.12 0.09 0.06 0.02
semi-qly(4) 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.03
semi-qly(5) 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.02
semi-qly(6) 0.17* 0.15* 0.13 0.13 0.11
semi-qly(7) -0.03 -0.04 -0.05 -0.08 -0.08
semi-qly(8) 0.1 0.05 0.04 0 -0.01
semi-qly(9) 0.31* 0.31* 0.24 0.34** 0.24
semi-qly 0.07* 0.07* 0.05 0.05 0.02
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